Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law by Chen, Ming H.
University of Colorado Law School
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship
2017
Administrator-in-Chief: The President and
Executive Action in Immigration Law
Ming H. Chen
University of Colorado Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
Copyright Statement
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and Educational Use clauses of the U.S.
Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
erik.beck@colorado.edu.
Citation Information
Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 347 (2017), available
at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/726.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation:
Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and
Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 Admin. L. Rev.
347, 430 (2017)


Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Sep  8 11:41:49 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
                                     Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
                                     your smartphone or tablet device 
ADMINISTRATOR-IN-CHIEF: THE
PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE ACTION IN
IMMIGRATION LAW
MING H. CHEN*
This Article provides a framework for understanding the role of the President as the
Administrator-in-Chief of the executive branch. Recent presidents, in the face of heated
controversy and political division, have relied on executive action to advance their
immigration policies. Which of these policies are legitimate, and which are vulnerable to.
challenge, will determine their legag. This Article posits that the extent to which the
President enhances the procedural legitimay of ageng actions strengthens the legac of the
policies when confronted regarding their substance. This emphasis on shoring up
administrative procedure is a form of expertise that should be counted alongside traditional
normative criteria such as political accountability, democratic participation, and efficieng.
Institutional analysis of three of President Obama's immigration policies serve as case
studies of a presidential attempt to strengthen the procedural legitimay of substantively
contentious policies: deferred action for long-term undocumented immigrants; immigration
detention for immigrants with criminal histories; and priority docketing of recently-arrived
immigrants seeking asylum. Interviews with Department of Homeland Security officials
and other policymakers shed light on the internal dynamics of agency policies. This
Article concludes with prescnptions for safeguarding the conditions under which executive
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action in immiration can be defended and rethinking the conditions under which it
cannot.
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INTRODUCTION
In the face of political division, presidents increasingly rely on executive
action to advance their signature policies.' While he was neither the first
nor the most prolific, President Barack Obama is remembered for issuing
prominent executive policies, including several on immigration.2 Similarly,
President Trump vigorously issued executive actions of his own in the
opening days of his administration-many to counter his predecessor's
policies on immigration.3 The legitimacy of these presidential policies is a
subject of sharp contention. Based on institutional analysis of the Obama
administration's key executive actions in immigration policy, this Article
posits that presidential policymaking is most effective when the president is
primarily acting as Administrator-in-Chief, rather than as chief
policymaker. 4
Behind the contemporary controversies over executive action in
immigration law is an enduring institutional concern. The administrative
presidency, defined as the President's systemic administration of
government through the apparatus of the regulatory state, animates much
of modern law and policymaking.5 President Obama's administration of
his signature policies was no different. Yet the administrative presidency is
1. President Obama issued fourteen executive orders in his first month in office and a
total of 276 executive orders in eight years. BARACK OBAMA EXECUTIVE ORDERS
DISPOSITION TABLES, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/
obama.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017). By way of comparison, President George W. Bush
issued 291 executive orders in eight years, President Clinton issued 364 executive orders in
eight years, and President Reagan issued 381 executive orders. EXECUTIVE ORDERS
DISPOSITION TABLES INDEX, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-
orders/disposition.html. (last visited Apr. 14; 2017).
2. Most notably, the Supreme Court proved unable to decide a twenty-seven state
challenge to President Obama's immigration program that would provide temporary repose
from deportation for undocumented immigrants, leaving in limbo one-half of the program
(Deferred Action for Parents of Americans, or DAPA) while the other half proceeds into its
fifth year (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA). Texas v. United StasIs, 136
S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). The 2012 DACA program remains in place.
3. Within his first month in office, President Trump signed twelve executive orders
including three executive orders on immigration. WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS:
EXECUTIVE ORDERS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
executive-orders. (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
4. While President Trump's executive orders similarly provide salient examples, many
of them were too recent to have been implemented by the time this Article went to press.
5. The focus of the President's relationship to the regulatory state here is on executive
agencies rather than independent agencies. Independent agencies merit separate analysis,
with a distinct set of case studies.
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a concept misunderstood and even lost within much of constitutional and
administrative law.6 Constitutional and administrative law scholars largely
emphasize structural concerns, such as the separation of powers and control
of agencies by the political branches; however valuable, these studies
exclude the more granular details of public administration from their
purview.7 The dynamics occurring inside agencies become a black box,
largely unknown and poorly understood. Despite the traditional discomfort
with a strong administrative state, most accept the modern regulatory state
as a matter of pragmatism or resignation to modern conditions despite their
ambivalence about its legitimacy.8  Rather than confronting their
discomfort with the complicated nature of administrative action, skeptics
reassure themselves by borrowing the normative justifications of other
branches: the democratic engagement of Congress, the political
accountability of the President, or the independence of courts. However,
there are some signs that the foundations of the administrative state are
under attack.9
6. Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92
TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2014) [hereinafter Farber & O'Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law] (discussing how rulemaking is not a clear three part procedure); see also
JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 5 (2012) [hereinafter MASHAW, CREATING THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION] (discussing the lack of concrete authority concerning
administrative rulemaking); Gillian Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2015).
7. David Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CON. L. &
PUB POL'VY 81 (2013); David Rubenstein, Black Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV.
983 (2016) (disputing the priority of the law in action and nonbinding federal laws such as
DACA over the INA due to structural logic). .
8. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("I dissent
from today's decision because I can find no place within our constitutional system for an
agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of
laws."). See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1095
(2009) (explaining how issues with administrative actions are inevitable).
9. In the past year alone, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan formed a working group on
executive overreach and the House passed a bill to restrict funds or nullify executive actions
that purportedly violate the separation of powers. Lewis K. Uhler & PeterJ. Ferrara, Ryan's
Executive Overreach Working Group: It's Time for Congress to 'Man Up' and Do Its Duty, DAILY
CALLER (July 26, 2016); H.R. 76 Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017 (clarifying
the nature ofjudicial review of agency interpretations of statutory and regulatory provisions).
Justice Thomas repeatedly dissented from administrative law decisions due to his desire to
rethink the foundations of the administrative state. See, e.g., Justice Thomas opinion in
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (ThomasJ. concurring) Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (ThomasJ. concurring) ("Because this doctrine
350 [69:2
ADMINISTRATOR-IN-CHIEF
This Article joins a budding scholarship that seeks to understand the
legitimacy of executive action by studying agencies from the inside out.10
Bringing together research on presidential control of agencies and the
legitimacy of executive action, it coins a new name for the president's role
in promoting the procedures by which his agencies administer federal
policy: the Administrator-in-Chief. The chief administrator is animated by
concerns for procedural soundness and administrative effectiveness. This
position undertakes supervisory actions that promote coherent federal
policy, seeks to centralize agency discretion to promote consistent decisions
within the agency, and attempts to coordinate actions across his
administration. The normative theory of the Administrator-in-Chief is that
the President is most justified when bolstering administrative procedure,
with the effect of enhancing perceptions of legitimacy by the agency
officials who implement them, and increasing their policy effectiveness.
Among the many notions of legitimacy-legal, moral, and sociological-
this Article focuses on a sociological conception." Empirical studies of
sociological legitimacy demonstrate that individuals cooperate with rules
based on their belief that the procedures used to enact the rules are
trustworthy and fair-in other words, procedurally legitimate-even when
effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency, it raises constitutional
concerns."). The Trump Administration's presidential campaign and initial orders featured
vigorous rebukes of executive action and a pledge to "deconstruct" the administrative state.
Presidential Executive Order on Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda (Feb. 24, 2017);
Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for "Deconstruction of the
Administrative State," WASH. POST (Feb 23, 2017).
10. See Lisa Bressman & Michael Vandenberg, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look
at Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (discussing EPA administrative
actions); Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1840-41
(2015) (surveying different agency actions including those at the IRS, the NSA, and the VA);
Eloise Pasachoff, The President's Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE LJ. 2182
(2016) (discussing Office of Management and Budget (OMB) administrative actions). Also
relevant is the internal separation of powers literature. See, e.g.,Jon Michaels, Of Constitutional
Custodians and Regulatory Rivals, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016) (arguing that separation of
powers includes fragmentation of internal administrative heads); see also Farber & O'Connell,
The Lost World of Administrative Law, supra note 6 (discussing how separation of powers is
mismatched); Sidney Shapiro & Ronald Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency:
Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (2010) (discussing how the
executive administration is more controlled by both internal factors as well as external
separation of powers forces).
11. See Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1787 (2005); see
also infra Part I.A.
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the rules disfavor their self-interest and substantive preferences. 2 This
insight into individual behavior can be extended to institutions as well. In
prior research, I show that state and local policymakers cooperate with
nonbinding federal policies they accept as procedurally legitimate, and they
decline to cooperate with nonbinding federal policies they regard as
illegitimate. 3  This Article builds on those studies by examining the
conditions under which presidential policies on immigration elicit
cooperation from the federal agencies involved in their implementation. It
uses immigration policies from the Obama administration as its policy
arena: deferred action for long-time immigrant residents, immigration
detention for criminal aliens, and priority docketing of recently-arrived
asylum seekers. The case studies contribute to existing administrative law
scholarship by arguing that the success of these policies rests on the
President acting as a good and fair administrator of his agencies.1 4 This
argument about the importance of administrative expertise counters
scholarly justifications of executive action based primarily on democratic
engagement and political accountability. 5 Rather, it augments those based
on substantive expertise. Without discounting the importance of political
accountability, this Article suggests that perfecting procedure is an
important component of the expertise that legitimates agency action.
Focusing on values of sound procedure and administrative expertise in
immigration law-an area marked by moral controversy and policy
complexity-is an approach that can be used to strengthen the institutions
involved in immigration policy. To be clear, the claim that procedural
12. Tom TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 5 (2006); ToM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE 15, 18-19 (2011).
13. Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: Understanding the Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2016) [hereinafter Chen, Beyond legality] (showing
pattern of state drivers' licenses being extended to DACA recipients); Ming H. Chen, Trust in
Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuay Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 13 (2015) [hereinafter Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement] (showing pattern
of local noncooperation with immigration detainers).
14. Infra Part II.B.
15. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2331-38 (2001)
(political accountability argument); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or 'The Decider'? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (political control argument); Richard
Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (interest
representation and democratic engagement model). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
469-485 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (summarizing legitimacy
accounts, critiquing accountability); Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and legitimacy, 67 VAND L.
REV. 2, 443 (2014) (summarizing legitimacy accounts in administrative law scholarship).
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legitimacy can strengthen institutions does not suggest that it can substitute
for moral legitimacy; the more modest claim is that it is necessary, even if
not sufficient, for moral acceptance. The claim is also not that procedural
legitimacy is compulsory; in many cases, the recommended practices go
beyond what is legally required.
This Article advances the theory of the President as an Administrator-in-
Chief through narrative description, normative analysis, and policy
prescription.
Descriptively, this Article builds on administrative theory recovering the
internal sphere of agency action by specifying the role of the President as
Administrator-in-Chief.1 6 Acting as an administrator means supervising the
administration of policies internal to the agencies. Examples of these tasks
include issuing executive actions undertaken to promote the coherence of
policy during complicated and sometimes competing administrative
realities, centralizing discretion to produce consistent decisions within
agencies, and coordinating agency initiatives across the executive branch.
These three C's-coherency, consistency, and coordination-are the
internal tasks of administration and they are inextricably related to the
success and effectiveness of policies, especially where the policies rely on
cooperation for their implementation and where moral consensus may be
lacking.
By placing the administrative presidency in context, this Article provides
an insider's perspective on executive policymaking. After disaggregating
the concepts of the President's internal administration and presidential
policy, the theories of good administration can be operationalized in terms
of the conditions of administration and connected to in-depth studies of
particular policies. This Article traces the policymaking process for three of
President Obama's immigration policies. The first case study is President
Obama's deferred action program, executed by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services' (USCIS's) use of regulatory guidance. The second case study is
President Obama's reboot of DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's (ICE's) use of immigration detainers to transfer "criminal
aliens" into civil detention.' 7 The third case study is the President and
16. The vocabulary of internal/external draws upon the work of Bruce Wyman and
early scholars of administrative law. It differs from modern scholarship on separation of
powers insofar as my use of internal and external focuses on the function of presidential and
administrative power, not the source of legal constraint. See BRUCE WYMAN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4,
14 (1903).
17. The term "criminal alien" comes from congressional statutes, such as the Criminal
3532017]
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DHS Secretary Johnson's memo announcing vigorous border control
measures for recently-arrived migrants from Central America in addition to
a DOJ memo establishing priority dockets for adjudicating these cases in
immigration court.18
The immigration case studies were chosen for their theoretical merits
and empirical significance as examples of executive policymaking. DHS's
literal focus on security and its ambitious, wide-ranging mission that
includes immigration makes it an exemplar of modern administration.19
Against the backdrop of history, the proliferation of agencies dedicated to
health and safety, environment, civil rights, and nationality security is
sometimes characterized as a security state. 20 Putting the case studies
together illustrates the key features of presidential influence on
administrative agencies. Yet the features relating the President to agencies
are distinctive across the case studies in instructive ways. The range of
policies selected varies along political orientation from extending or
opposing immigrants' rights to promoting or deferring enforcement,
involving states, Congress, and the general public. They also vary in
policymaking form: agency policy statement, enforcement actions, and
agency adjudication. This range and complexity of immigration policies
Alien Program, targeting immigrants with criminal histories. See U.S. ICE, Criminal Alien
Program: Overview (Mar. 29, 2017, 4:30pm) [hereinafter Criminal Alien Program: Overview],
https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program. It is a contested term due to its imprecision
(referring to a variety of crimes, pre- and post-conviction circumstances, and enforcement
efforts that exceed the stated purposes) and the moral valence it has acquired in a
contentious political environment. Nevertheless, it is used, within quotations, because it
denotes the parameters of the official government policies under examination in the Article,
however problematic. See id.
18. Each case study combines information and analysis from a variety of print sources
and in-depth interviews with U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) government
officials, civil servant staff, and immigration attorneys and advocates. I spoke with former
and current immigration officials within the agencies most relevant for each case study. I
also spoke with immigration attorneys, policy analysts, or community organizers familiar
with the policies. All interviews were conducted off-the-record, with the understanding that
generalized statements could be made without attribution, in accordance with University of
Colorado IRB Protocol 16-0484 exemptions 2, 3. For more on the methodology, see infra
Part II.
19. See DHS., Our Mission (Mar. 26, 2017, 12:15pm), https://www.dhs.gov/our-
mission.
20. Administrative law histories describe periods of growth in the administrative state,
with the modern era described as a security state. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL
JUSTICE 45 (1985); Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189 (1986).
354 [69:2
ADMINISTRATOR-LN-CHIEF
permits variation that helps to build the theory of the Administrator-in-
Chief.2 1
The formation of DHS-an executive agency born of a major
reorganization following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001-
provides a critical juncture in policy development and a rare opportunity to
view the politics and bureaucratic control surrounding the agency's
design.22 Also, the agency is enormous: it melds together twenty-two
preexisting agencies, employs a quarter million federal workers, and
governs a variety of critical matters.23 Immigration policy, a high stakes
area, is an easy case for the argument that we need good administration in
an era of ambitious executive policy. The tendency toward strong federal
power is high and the risk of abuse equally so-the issue is predominantly
governed by federal statutes, it benefits from presumptions of plenary
power and preemption, it is often embroiled in sovereignty matters. 24 To
the extent that it is exceptional as a policy arena, its extremities make
recurrent institutional problems in the administrative presidency more
apparent.
The chronic search for legitimacy in the administrative state is not just
about legal trespass.25 It is about normative trade-offs in a regulatory state
that is prolific and yet rests on contested Constitutional underpinnings.
Normatively, this Article argues that a president's concern for sound public
administration can improve the quality, effectiveness, and acceptance of
executive policy that relies on agency officials for their implementation. In
contrast, procedurally illegitimate executive actions suffer, no matter how
compelling the substance of those policies. Attention to sound public
administration in government is important for fulfilling policy objectives
21. Another possibility is to compare executive action across presidential
administrations. While there are advantages to this method, the disadvantage is that
differences in political climate and social context confuse the focus on institutional dynamics
and the broad scope necessitates more sweeping generalizations.
22. The sharp break of September 11 represents a critical juncture in political
development. Giovanni Capoccia, Critical Junctures and Institutional Change, ADVANCES IN
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney &
Kathleen Thelen eds., 2015).
23. Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of
LegalMandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2006).
24. See Gabriel Jack Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Ongins of Plenary Power,
IMMIGRATION STORIEs (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); cf GabrielJ. Chin,
Is There a Plenay Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional
Constitutional Immigration Law 14 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 257 (1999) (hereinafter Chin, Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine?] (commentary by Kevin Johnson et al.)
25. SeeJAMEs 0. FREEMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 10-13 (1978).
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and also safeguarding the institutions that embody them. Consequently,
those seeking to understand the promises and perils of President Obama's
use of executive action should first attend to public administration. Their
concerns for the vulnerability of executive action in the face of lacking
moral consensus in immigration policy should motivate them to focus on
institutional conditions that support legitimacy, rather than becoming
overly mired in the substantive particulars. However important the
substantive particulars, progress will be undermined without strong
institutions that can withstand controversy and change.
The theory of an Administrator-in-Chief articulates good governance
and policy effectiveness as values in executive policymaking. Prescriptively,
this Article adds to existing accounts of executive action with a theoretical
framework built for an Administrator-in-Chief. It operationalizes that
value in a typology of administrative tasks: promoting coherent policy in
the face of complex and competing administrative pressures, centralizing
discretion to make consistent policy within agencies and within a
decentralized state, and coordinating actions to make effective policy across
the executive branch. It then connects those tasks with substantive policies
that cut across policy orientation and policymaking form. It prescribes
constraints to balance the need for sound internal administration with the
pressures beyond the agency and to build a common ground of procedural
legitimacy-a common ground that is vital with controversial policies and
divisive politics. Other legitimating accounts posit democratic engagement
and political accountability as the main reason to permit administrative
policy, often at the expense of the agency's substantive expertise.26 These
accounts fail to recognize sound procedure and effective public
administration as a distinctive form of expertise and a criterion of
administrative legitimacy. 27  The model of the Administrator-in-Chief
contributes to the project ofjustifying the administrative state by identifying
circumstances under which presidential involvement in the administrative
state is legitimate: by forging coherent policy, by encouraging consistent
decisions, and by coordinating actions. These conditions free agencies to
do what they do best-execute and implement policy.
26. Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2255.
27. See, e.g.,JERRY L. MASHAw, BUREAUCRATICJUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) (laying out a typology for public administration that includes
bureaucratic rationality, professionalism, and moral judgment as different models for agency
aspiration). Rather than presuming moral judgment as the paragon of justice, by way of
judicial or legislative or corporate analogy, this enlarged focus permits a wider range of
organizational goals. Consistency, coherence, rationality, for example, motivate public
agencies as a type of organization and legal institution. See id.
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There are scholarly and policy implications for research that brings
together legitimacy theory, administrative procedure, and immigration
policy. Attention to the legitimatizing conditions of presidential
policymaking will be useful to immigration scholars and reformers during a
time when significant immigration policy unfolds in the executive branch
and during time when moral consensus is lacking about important national
policies. This Article facilitates an ongoing evaluation of executive policies
in immigration during times when moral consensus about the substance of
those policies is lacking. President Obama, in the face of congressional
resistance to legislative reform, advanced signature immigration policies
using executive action.2 8 Which of those actions is legitimate, and which
are vulnerable to challenge, is critically important for the legacy of those
policies. Taking an in-depth look at President Obama's immigration
policies uncovers lessons of consequence during moments of political and
policy transition. Immigration is always a value-laden and controversial
policy arena, and it concerns core national debates about the very rules that
constitute the nation.2 9 It has played a particularly prominent role during
the presidential transition.30
A portrait of the internal dynamics in a vast, complex modern
bureaucracy will be useful to scholars working on general theories of the
administrative state and policy reformers seeking to improve it. Given the
modern propensity toward executive expansion, this Article illustrates
necessary constraints in an otherwise broad grant of executive authority.
Immigration policy provides a salient example of the risks inherent in
executive policymaking given the high stakes, divisive politics, and long
tradition of deference to the executive branch.3 '
Evaluators of President Obama's immigration policies should take heed
of the new brand of administrative law scholarship that peers inside
agencies.32 This Article contributes to that line of scholarship. Focusing
28. Criminal Alien Program: Overview, supra note 17, and accompanying text.
29. Catherine Kim, Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination Lens, 91 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 1, 207-208 (2015) (discussing congressional reaction to the attempted
implementation of the Obama Administration's DACA and DAPA programs).
30. For examples of President Trump's focus on the immigration issue, see Julie
Hirschfeld Davis et al., Tmmp, in Optimistic Address, Asks Congress to End 'Trivial Fights", N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/trump-address-
congress.html?_r=0.
31. The plenary power doctrine is credited as the source for extraordinary deference to
the political branches in immigration laws and the source of much scholarly commentary.
See e.g. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There A Plenary Power
Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 307, 307 (2000).
32. An exemplar of this body of scholarship is Bressman & Vandenberg, supra note 10.
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exclusively on Congress or the substantive policy dimension of executive
action that has dominated public debate distracts us from understanding
the institutional dynamics animating executive policies. The failure to
distinguish the President's administrative and policymaking functions, and
the false assumption that agency action seeks to surreptitiously circumvent
democratic processes, leads to misunderstandings about agencies' work. It
breeds suspicion of agencies' motives regarding policymaking. The
suspicion imposes unfair demands on agency operations. It also obscures
opportunities for understanding how best to reign in administrative excess
when necessary and appropriate. More broadly, the conflation of internal
administration and external administration of law exacerbates chronic
concerns about the legitimacy of both presidential power and
administrative action.33 Ironically, it also contributes to political division
that sometimes drives presidents to resort to executive action.
Part I describes the President's complex task of administering a vast
regulatory state. It disaggregates the multiple functions of the executive
into internal administration and policymaking. In keeping with scholarship
on presidential administration, it describes core functions of internal
administration. Extending this scholarship, it then relates the internal
administration to the external policymaking aspect of presidential action
and discusses the conditions required to maintain legitimacy amid political
division. Part II applies the internal administration and external
policymaking analysis to three case studies of enforcement discretion in
immigration law under President Obama's administration. Part III
examines the implications of reframing the President as Administrator-in-
Chief. It prescribes specific steps that can be taken to integrate presidential
policy into the administrative state in a legitimate manner.
I. THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
A. Legitimacy ofExecutive Action
Underlying the concept of an Administrator-in-Chief is the systemic
administration of government through presidential oversight of the
33. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE LJ. 1, 44
(2014) (discussing general patterns of action and reaction between congressional and agency
actions, such as the phenomenon whereby "Aggrieved officials cease to follow ordinary
norms of cooperation and constraint... this dynamic is perfectly predictable once we attend
to the tools and incentives of the actors within each branch . . ."); William Marshall, Actually
We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama Administration's Commitment to Unilateral Executive Branch
Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 773 (2014) (describing the polarization that leads Congressional
dysfunction and presidential exercises of power).
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regulatory state. The legitimacy of those executive actions, more
specifically the President's intervention in the administration of public
policy, is a central concern to administrative law scholars. 34 Much of this
legitimacy scholarship is concerned with normative theories of legitimacy.
Legal theorists posit that legitimacy can be disaggregated into substantive
and procedural components, and empirical scholars advance this insight by
showing that fair procedures can elicit voluntary cooperation from
individual and institutional actors and thereby increase its effectiveness.35
The focus in this Article is primarily on the President's pursuit of
procedural legitimacy as a justification for his administrative policies. Its
claim is that presidential attention to administration coupled with agency
expertise lends credibility to presidential policies. Thus, the President can
positively impact his policy effectiveness by promoting practices of good
government in agencies rather than trying to substitute his policymaking
judgments for those of the agency. The President's role, as Administrator-
in-Chief, constitutes a distinctive form of administrative expertise that, in
turn, normatively justifies the administrative policies.
This argument about administrative expertise mediates between two
poles in the normative scholarship about the role of law and politics in the
presidential control of agencies. Those who worry that administrative
agencies lack the political accountability and democratic responsiveness of
other branches of government rely on the ability of agencies to borrow
democratic authority from their nationally-elected president or emulate the
legislative process by relying on APA rulemaking procedures to legitimize
agency action.36 Those who worry that agencies' vulnerability to political
34. For a sample of the administrative scholarship on legitimacy, see generally Sydney
Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Ageng for Legitimay, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (discussing how to legitimize executive administrative
actions in a constitutional liberal democracy); Emily Hammond & David L. Markell,
Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimay from the Inside Out, 37 HARv. ENvTL.
L. REV. 313 (2013) (discussing judicial review as a mechanism to legitimize administrative
action); William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises ofAdministrative Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 101 (2015) (discussing the background-looking conception of legitimacy). The
jurisprudential scholarship on legitimacy is sufficiently vast that it deserves separate
treatment.
35. See Fallon, supra note 11 (three strands of moral, procedural, and legal legitimacy);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. I
(1994) (substantive and political); see also supra notes 12-13.
36. The seminal example of the political accountability justification can be found in
Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15 (using examples from the Clinton
administration to show presidential administration bolsters agency accountability and
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influence will compromise their substantive expertise lean on structural
constraints to safeguard the agencies' ability to make independent
judgments and enact rational policy-internal constraints such as the
separation of power within agencies, or external constraints such as judicial
review or legislative control of agency regulations.3 7 Those who worry that
agencies will flounder in their execution of presidential priorities, whether
due to supervisory lapses or agency dysfunction, treat agencies as if they
were businesses. Agency competence is measured by their fidelity as agents
of a principal, efficiency, or other proxies for performance; these reforms
target tighter control.3 8
Agencies do aspire to cultivate democratic attributes (like Congress),
independence (like courts), and efficiency (like private organizations). But
their institutional posture as policy implementers is distinct from these other
branches.39 Given the futility of analogizing agencies to Congress, courts,
and private organizations, those who believe in the importance of the
administrative state should look inside the executive branch and more
specifically at presidential engagement with agencies. 40 After all, execution
of policy is where the President's influence on agency action is strongest.
Presidential policymaking, or quasi-legislative actions, are a virtual necessity
in some circumstances.4 ' Yet it sits uncomfortably with our traditional
effectiveness, and claiming that presidential control is implied in congressional delegations to
agencies).
37. For the relationship between judicial review and internal procedure, see Gillian
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59
EMORY L.J. 423 (2009).
38. Public choice theory typifies this approach to agency behavior. Studies of the OMB
and Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) are often premised on these
managerial assumptions as well. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAw (Dan Farber & AnneJoseph O'Connell eds., 2010) [hereinafter RESEARCH
HANDBOOK].
39. See generally HAROLD BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006) (calling usual separation of powers framework ill-suited
to the blended functions within agencies).
40. Whether the President is limited to overseeing the agencies or welcome to decide
the agency's substantive stances is a matter of considerable debate, as is the propriety of an
agency taking actions responsive to the President's priorities. Peter Strauss provides an
overview of struggle for control of agencies in his essay. Strauss, supra note 15 (sparking a
debate among administrative law scholars about the limited role of president as overseer in
most circumstances); see also Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving
Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017) (addressing further
issues in the overseer-decider debate).
41. Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez emphasize this point because, in their account,
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understanding of the three branches of government and the traditional
primacy of Congress over lawmaking.
In the abstract, the inattention to internal administration and
administrative effectiveness can be remedied by resorting to generic forms
of executive oversight. White House regulatory review, such as by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), serves to oversee some administrative
aspects of regulation.42 The theory behind executive oversight is that while
OIRA is a generalist in substantive policy, it is expert in public
administration and can improve the quality and effectiveness of agency
policy through the assertion of this type of administrative expertise.
However, OIRA uses blunt tools and limited measures of agency
performance, asserting efficiency and cost-savings as the primary
manifestations of administrative competence without adequately
considering values such as fairness, reputation, legal and policy acumen,
operational success, and commitment to organizational mission.43
Additionally, OIRA's tools of regulatory control presume neutrality,
which is inconsistent with the moral controversy that characterizes much
Congress has de facto delegated policymaking to the executive branch through its inactions
and inconsistencies. Consequently, they maintain the primacy of the political branches in
immigration law should focus on the President. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
President and Immiration Law Redux, 119 YALE LJ. 458, 530-32 (2009) [hereinafter Cox &
Rodriguez, Redux 1]. This renewed focus enhances the rule of law, transparency, and
organizational effectiveness. While I largely agree with Cox and Rodriguez, my argument
focuses on prudential matters rather than power. Although not in the context of
immigration, similar approaches are taken by Justice Scalia in Mistretta. v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative
Law, supra note 8 (discussing how statutes, judicial decisions and institutional practice either
explicitly or implicitly exempt the executive from legal constraints).
42. See Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Sept. 30, 1993); see also OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-16-11, MEMORANDUM
FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, IMPROVING
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS THROUGH SHARED SERVICES (2016) (providing OMB
guidance aimed at making executive agencies more effective and efficient through uniform
management of "common business activities," i.e., financial management, HR, acquisitions,
IT).
43. See e.g. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the 1iceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (claiming that OIRA is overstaffed by
civil servants who possess economic training and are privy to deregulatory agendas);
RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How CosT-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (Oxford
University Press 2008) (taking issue with the manner in which cost-benefit analysis is
conducted).
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agency action-indeed, the controversy is often why the policy has been
delegated to agencies.44  Looking inside the executive branch, and
specifically inside agencies, draws attention to values of good governance
and procedural fairness as normative ideals for presidential
administration. 45 This attention to procedural fairness that builds trust in
institutions is vital to the longevity of policy. 46 Focusing more on the
internal character of public administration has another virtue: it fosters
clearer understandings of how agencies operate, and provides valuable
glimpses inside specific agencies. For this Article, the immigration-related
agencies at DHS and DOJ furnish concrete examples of the importance of
attending to procedural fairness and expert administration in a complex
and controversial area of policy.
. B. Functions of the President as Administrator-in-Chief
Executive action can take many forms and has many sources. In its
strongest form, executive action can be legally binding presidential
directives or sub-delegations to agencies. 47
Typically, agencies implement statutory mandates, delegated by
Congress under Article I.48 These are strong forms of policymaking in the
sense that they are conventionally law-like: legally binding and judicially
44. David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of
Powers: a political science approach, 20 CARDoZO L REv. 947, 949 (1999) (discussing reasons
why Congress chooses to delegate to Agencies, including reasons of 'legislative efficiency').
45. Jerry Mashaw uses "bureaucratic rationality" to describe good governance. See
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATICJUSTICE, supra note 27. Daniel Carpenter uses "reputation." See
Daniel Carpenter, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTIcAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010); see Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to
Supesvise, supra note 10 (using "supervision").
46. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE, supra note 12.
47. Executive orders issue from the President, are binding on agencies, and are
recorded in the Federal Register. 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). Executive actions are broader.
The Federal Register Act requires that executive orders and proclamations be published in
the Federal Register. Id. Furthermore, executive orders must comply with preparation,
presentation, and publication requirements established by an executive order issued by
President Kennedy. See Exec. Order No. 11030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (1962) (codified at 1
C.F.R. § 19). President Obama did not use an executive order in the immigration case
studies; rather, he relied on the DHS Secretary to release agency guidance to enact the
programs. Remarks by President Obama on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-
immigration.
48. U.S. CONsT. art I.
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enforced. These executive actions constitute the primary subject of modern
administrative law. Scholars who study the legal sources of presidential
power conclude that presidents are powerful-sometimes too powerful-
and prone to overreaching and entangling of substance and procedure.49
They are the scholars most often concerned about the legitimacy of
presidential involvement in policymaking and most tempted to resort to
congressional oversight.5 0
The President can also exercise softer policymaking power under
Article II by supervising executive agencies.5 1 This form of presidential
influence involves oversight of administrative procedure and attention to
administrative realities.52  First, presidential influence is bound up in
operational details such as planning, overseeing, and allocating resources
that make coherent policy possible within a complicated bureaucracy.
Second, presidential influence requires shaping agency decisionmaking to
produce consistent results within agencies. Third, presidential influence
requires coordinating within and across agencies to promote consistency
across a decentralized executive branch. Many of these soft powers are
nonreviewable as they rely on the "power to persuade" others to achieve
their primary goals, rather than legal control over intra-agency discretion,
49. See generally EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (1940)
(discussing the trend of consolidating power within executive departments of all
governments, inevitably concentrating it within an administration). The administrative law
literature on presidential control of agencies resonates with this conception of the President's
invocation of strong power. See generally Robert V. Percival, Who 's in Charge? Does the President
Have Directive Authority over Ageny Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2488 (2011)
(describing three views of presidential directive authority over regulatory decisions entrusted
by statute to agency heads and adopting directive authority as interpretive principle); Nina
Mendelson, Another Word on the President' Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2455, 2458 (2011) [hereinafter Mendelson, Another Word] (suggesting that the President
has directive authority regardless of whether Congress delegates specific powers to an
agency). But cf Kevin Stack, The Reviewability of the President's Statutoy Powers, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 1171, 1121 (2009) (stating that, when asserting statutory authority, both the President
and agency heads can only exercise powers specifically delegated by that statute).
50. See Corwin, supra note 49.
51. In addition to vast public administration scholarship, see Metzger, The Constitutional
Duty to Supervise, supra note 10. This emphasis on supervision is similar to Peter Strauss'
description of "oversight" vs. "decision-making." Strauss, supra note 15. Note: Agencies
include executive and independent forms, and the latter particularly raise concerns about
the unitary executive. The focus in this Article is on executive agencies that are assumed to
be within the supervisory chain of the president.
52. A non-comprehensive list includes Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra
note 10; see also Pasachoff, supra note 10; Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (2015) (setting forth similar typologies).
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interagency decisions, and state policies.53 Consequently, some scholars
misunderstand practices of supervision and soft power as evading the rule
of law or at least lacking the procedures used to guard against executive
overreach. These are the scholars most committed to the separation of
powers, whether achieved by internal or external mechanisms of control.
The Administrator-in-Chief theory emphasizes the softer exercises of
power captured in the internal administration of law.54 One leading
administrative law casebook defines public administration as "the body of
general rules and principles governing administrative agencies" 5 5 and
another calls it the "relations of [public] officers with each other." 56 This
internal administrative law governs how agencies do their work. It
concerns the part of administration that occurs inside the administrative
agencies and the executive branch more broadly.5 7 It enables the running
of a public organization. Much of it is ministerial and technical. It relies
more on prudence than power. Still, it involves discretionary judgment
with significant policy implications. The policymaking face of agencies is
more familiar, by way of analogy to legislatures and courts, and emphasizes
agency actions that advance substantive policy outcomes.58  If the
procedures of agency administration are underemphasized in the scholarly
imagination, the substance of agency policy is overemphasized.
The administrative face of presidential policy is obscured in doctrinal
analysis and abstract theory on presidential control of agencies.59 Doctrinal
articles discussing the constitutional lines of power under Article II's take-
care or faithful-execution clauses and how they interact with Article I's
vesting of legislative power in Congress are important for establishing the
53. For an example of agency utilization of 'soft power' to avoid notice-and-comment,
see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure Out About
Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 16 (2009). Other examples include non-
compulsory gestures to induce cooperation, including creating incentives, appealing to the
moral authority of his office, and rewarding desirable behaviors.
54. See WILLIAM Fox, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84 (3rd ed. 1997);
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration: An Essay, 2 POL. SC. Q. 197, 212 (1887)
("Public administration is detailed and systemic execution of law.").
55. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAw:
CASES AND COMMENTS 11 (11th ed. 2011).
56. See WYMAN, supra note 16, at 14; see also ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF
JERRY MASHAW 5 (Unpublished Manuscript) (on file with author).
57. See WYMAN, supra note 16, at 14.
58. Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, supra note 15 at 448-49 (discussing different
models of agency legitimacy such as the transmission belt vs. policymaker analogies).
59. See Shapiro et al., supra note 34; Bruce Ackerman in The New Separation ofPowers, 113
HARv. L. REV. 633, 696 (2000).
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outer bounds of presidential power. However, they can lose sight of the
purpose .of those parameters in their emphasis on powers rather than
prudence. That's where Tom Tyler's empirical insights on cooperation
come back into focus: power matters because it secures a threshold of legal
legitimacy upon which cooperation can be built.60 General theories of
legitimacy miss the nuance inherent in empirical studies, especially studies
of immigration policy where the procedures are consequential and
complex. That is where the substantive case studies come in.
To make the point more concrete: a defining feature of President
Obama's administration of immigration law is his institutionalization of
enforcement priorities for agencies.6' These priorities bind together
substance and procedure to address major issues in the field by providing
temporary relief from deportation to long-term immigrants residing without
documentation, propagating more aggressive techniques for deporting
immigrants with criminal histories, and responding to unexpected and
uncontrolled flows of migration.6 2  There are general lessons for
presidential administration in these particulars. The subsections that follow
highlight the three C's as features of being Administrator-in-Chief:
prioritizing enforcement to produce coherent policy, overseeing the discretion
of agency staff to produce consistent policy, and coordinating across
agencies. Sustained examples of each will be provided in Part II.
1. Promoting Coherent Policy
Most important among the three tasks of an administrator-in-chief is
creating coherent policy in the face of complex administrative realities and
conflicting pressures. This involves agenda setting through the allocation of
resources, selection of personnel, and establishment of priorities. Faced
with systemic and individual resistance to change, the President instigates
agency action and galvanizes bureaucratic expertise. 63
Ideally, the President sets priorities for the agency in ways that integrate
his policies into the agency's operations. The President, with the assistance
of White House staff selects and supervises an agency head to help him
60. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE, supra note 12.
61. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE LJ. 104, 187-88 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, Redux 2].
62. Cox and Rodriguez point to DAPA as a program that institutionalizes discretion
through the adoption of specific procedures and channels of supervision. Id.
63. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2281-99 (2001); Harold H.
Bruff Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 461 (2010).
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implement his priorities. 64 The President is the principal; his appointees
are his agents.6 5 The President's selection of agency personnel who share
his policy priorities can lead regulatory agencies to implement the
presidential agenda through agency rulemaking and adjudicatory powers,
typically operating by suggestion, rather than assertion. 66  However,
sometimes the agency leadership clashes with the President.6 7 The White
House offices can serve as an intermediary by shaping agency
policymaking. Executive Order 12866 directs OIRA to coordinate agency
planning and to review the costs and benefits of an agency's proposed
regulations.68 Presidential policies are channeled through the White House
to the agency's leadership, who implement policy through agency staff.
While presidential pressure on an executive agency is real, an agency
does more than mindlessly follow the President. The President's process of
obtaining accession from the agency is a means to an end. It is not an
assured outcome. As Harold Bruff states:
Specific directives, such as those by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, can
overcome the ossification of rulemaking and galvanize agency action on particular
topics. They are a way for presidents to cut through the complex web of relationships
with public and private entities that any agency inhabits and give it a direction to
follow. 6 9
Elena Kagan has also recognized the many resources a president has to
influence the scope and content of administrative action, "even absent any
assertion of directive authority," so long as Congress has not prohibited the
64. WILLIAMJ. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CHAPTER 38, PART II (3rd ed.
2016.)
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2 (Appointments Clause).
67. Sometimes when there is a clash between the President and Agency leadership,
whether or not the President can fire the agency head is heavily litigated. See, e.g., Marcy
Gordon, Trump Administration Wants Freer Hand to Fire Head of Agency, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17,
2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/trump-admin-fire-head-consumer-
agency-46212643.
68. See Pasachoff, supra note 10 (describing the "M" and "B" sides of OMB as
management tools that implicate policy and noting the interaction between OMB budgeting
and congressional apportionment). Cass Sunstein and Lisa Heinzerling disagree about the
extent to which OIRA focuses on cost-benefit analysis and interagency planning and
coordination concerns. Compare Cass Sunstein, Office of Information and Regulatoy Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1842 (2013), with Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A
Former Insider's Reflections on the Relationship between Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 340-42 (2012).
69. See Bruff supra note 63, at 487.
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specific interpretive exercise and so long as the agency acts in a manner
that respects institutional integrity. 70
Political accountability is typically the normative justification for this
task. For example, a president's directives ensure that the agency policies
are imbued with the support of a national constituency.7 ' However,
presidential intervention that promotes coherence can provide
complementary benefits such as predictability, regularity, transparency, and
effectiveness.72
2. Centralizing Discretion for Consistent Decisions Within Agencies
The President can oversee the quality and consistency of agency
decisionmaking by mobilizing the department secretary, who in turn guides
exercises of agency discretion by a smaller number of agency officials.
Typically, those agency heads serve in the agency's headquarters, although
matters could be channeled to officials in agency components and their
field offices.73
Generally, the President will work with his appointed agency heads and
their politically-appointed delegates to ensure that discretion is exercised by
the civil servant staff in a manner consistent with the organic statute
governing the agency and presidential priorities. 74 These priorities will be
counterbalanced against the agency's sense of its congressional mandate
70. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2298 (noting that this
interpretive principle flows from Article II and is a better understanding of congressional
intent than the unitary executive approach); see also Mendelson, Another Word, supra note 49,
at 2458 (concurring that the president can act without express statutory authority, e.g., when
a statute delegates to a secretary or an administrator on the basis of statutory interpretation
rather than constitutional interpretation).
71. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2372 (Discussing the Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Hampton case, in that it suggests that presidential action can enable
political accountability and that this accountability-if lent to administrative action through
presidential directive - can ease concerns relating to the exercise of broad grants of
discretion).
72. Id. at 2252.
73. For examples from scholarly literature that include the processing of disability
claims in the Social Security Administration, see MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra
note 27, (describing adjudication of asylum claims in the immigration courts of the DOJ);
JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE (2007), or permitting for wetlands in the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, see Dave Owen, Regional Federalism Administration, 63 UCLA
L. REv. 58 (2016).
74. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2289 (discussing the premise
that the simple delegation of rulemaking authority to a specified agency head would not
prevent the President from making a final decision).
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and professional norms.75 The political leadership may also oversee and
determine benchmarks for agency performance or specify standards and
uniform definitions that an agency might further elaborate through the
promulgation of more detailed regulations.76 These forms of supervision
operate in the interstices, or some would say the minutiae, of agency
actions. Yet they implicate agency decisionmaking and policymaking in
profound ways.7 7
Another task for the President is influencing decisionmaking among
states and private actors in a decentralized state.78 Federal law cannot
compel these actors.79 The President's task is distinct from controlling
agency discretion-where the President and his appointees can compel
compliance as a matter of right-especially in executive agencies with at-
will removal and hierarchical means of control.80 Rather, the President
and his administration rely on powers of persuasion to shape decisions
across a vast network.81
Normatively, the justification for this type of presidential intervention is
supervisory and flows from the President's role as chief executive. 82 The
President is uniquely able to coordinate actions across the executive
branch. Coordination within agencies is critical as a matter of public
administration and the rule of law. Where the President and agency
leadership differ in an executive agency, the agency officials yield to the
President so long as the President's policies remain permissible under
75. Norms of professionalism will vary according to the agency. At the FDA, scientific
integrity may function as a norm. In a law enforcement organization such as the FBI, the
law itself may function as a professional norm.
76. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2297 (noting that often
significant White House participation in formulating the content of the presidential
directives to agencies occurs, as well as in overseeing their execution).
77. The seminal study is Jerry Mashaw's Bureaucratic Justice, which examines agency
discretion in the Social Security Administration. See MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE,
supra note 27.
78. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra note 10.
7 9. Id.
80. It also differs from a unitary executive theory of government, which typically
pertains to the president's control over independent agencies and preemption, which
requires federal primacy over states in instances of conflicting statutory interpretations. For
an overview of disagreements in unitary executive theory, see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
35.
81. For examples, see text accompanying supra note 53.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.").
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legislative, judicial, executive, and professional norms.83 The unifying
influences of the President can come into conflict with the value of agency
expertise or good governance. 84 The pressure for uniformity can conflict
with the agency's need for independence from political or private
influence.85 It can also come into tension with the value of dissent from
agency leaders and civil servants who can check presidential power,
providing an internal separation of powers and promoting competing
norms of professionalism or substantive policy when an agency is overly
swayed by the President.8 6
3. Coordinating Agency Action Across the Executive Branch
Implicit in this description of the relationship between the President and
his agencies is that successful executive action depends on coordination
across the executive branch. The nature and extent of the administrative
state forces agencies to act in a regulatory space shared by other
regulators.8 7 Also contributing to this regulatory overlap is the vast scope of
the administrative state, its unclear and sometimes redundant functions,
and its fragmentation across multiple agencies. Sometimes a transcendent
authority, such as the President, is required to work out the differences.
The President possesses the power to coordinate agency activities and to
mediate conflicts within this shared space.88 Within a department such as
83. The example of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) taming detainer
practices through the imposition of enforcement discretion-first the Morton memos, then
the replacement of Secure Communities with the Priorities Enforcement Program (PEP)-
illustrates the operational chain of command. See infra Part II.B.2.
84. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 735 (2002); Bressman, Beyond Accountability,
supra note 15 at 462 (promoting good governance as key concern for arbitrariness, rather
than majoritarianism or accountability).
85. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future ofAgency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 611-14 (2010).
86. The concept of internal dissent and regulatory resistance appears in social science
studies of agencies and legal scholarship on administrative constitutionalism. See, e.g.,
MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2000); Ming H. Chen, Where You Stand
Depends on Where You Sit: Immigrant Incorporation in Federal Workplace Agencies, 33 BERKLEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 227 (2012) [hereinafter Chen, Where You Stand]; Gillian Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1897 (2012); Sophia Lee, Race, Sex, and
Rulemaking:Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 96 VA. L. REV. 799 (2010).
87. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARv. L. REV. 1131 (2012)
88. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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DHS, the Secretary may prod his assistants and deputies within the office
to secure agreement between agency components such as ICE, Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP), and USCIS. The President or his surrogates may
also mediate conflicts among divisions within a single agency, such as the
Office of General Counsel, which is charged with legal advice and the
policy branches.89
The President may coordinate actions across the executive branch, such
as when he reconciles the prosecution of immigration enforcement claims
brought by DHS attorneys against immigrants in removal proceedings that
take place within the immigration courts that are housed in the DOJ's
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).90 Interagency working
groups focused on cross-cutting issues help agencies share information,
reach understandings, and work out differences. 91 Bilateral negotiations
between agency leadership mediate these conflicts across the executive
branch.9 2
Like the discussion of centralized decisionmaking, the justification for
presidential coordination is primarily good governance. Coordination
enhances the consistency and effectiveness of government, rendering
89. This internal fragmentation offers a form of separated powers analogous to
constitutional self-checking. Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE LJ. 2314, 2318 (2006) (discussing how the executive
is not "unitary" and proposing mechanisms that can create checks and balances within the
executive); see Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship, supra note 37, at 426-35 (describing
"internal separation of powers mechanisms"); see also Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and
Regulatory Rivals, supra note 10; Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE LJ. 1032, 1036 (2011) (stating agencies are a "they, not an it"); Dan
Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017). Jennifer Nou discusses similar issues that flow from agency heads coordinating
interagency action. See Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, supra note 52.
90. DOJ, Organization Chart: EOIR (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
organization-chart.
91. Interagency working groups on national origin have been important to the
protection of vulnerable workers and survivors of domestic violence. Visas such as the U-
visa, which permits immigrants to normalize their immigration status in exchange for
helping law enforcement to investigate other illegal activities, came out of these types of
working groups. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1175 (2012) (noting that the President requests that agencies
coordinate with each other).
92. For example, there is a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the
Department of Labor and ICE over the non-prosecution of immigrants who have reported
labor abuses at the hands of their employers on the occasions when the employer calls in a
tip. See also Farber & O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, supra note 89 (offering a typology of
conflicting arrangements and corresponding mechanisms for dispute resolution).
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different actors as partners in policymaking and avoiding chaos that flows
from a lack of coordination. In routine matters, the chaos is unnecessary
and undesirable.93 Executive branch policies may undermine one another
with insufficient coordination. The President serves as a broker between
his agencies when co-equals come into conflict or when it comes time to
seek funding from Congress. Procedural values of regularity and
transparency, linked to procedural legitimacy, flow from interagency
coordination.9 4
C. Relating Administration to Policymaking
The defining question in this Article is under what circumstances is
presidential policymaking, through his influence on agencies, normatively
justifiable. Parts L.A and I.B posited that the answer depends on whether
executive intervention concerns public administration of agencies defined
by the three C's-coherence, consistency, and coordination. The manner
in which conflicts are managed between an agency and the public is
important when agency actions affect the general public through the
generation of public policy.
Objections to presidential management of agencies are often motivated
by concerns about the secondary effects of internal administration beyond
the agency. The imposition of secondary effects on third parties can lead to
executive policies impacting Congress, states, and private parties. While
not inherently problematic, critics call it executive lawmaking, implying
that presidential management operates unilaterally and circumvents
Congress's legislative power or otherwise violates the rule of law and other
professional norms.
Internal administration and external policymaking can be closely related
and sometimes overlap. However, these two facets of presidential
93. The overcrowding of the immigration courts following the post-DHS separation of
investigation and adjudication is an example. See Part II.B.3.
94. As will be discussed more in Part III.C, there is the risk that over-friendly agencies
with overlapping jurisdiction will be less likely to counter one another or could propel
forward bad policy without adequate deliberation or experimentation. In these
circumstances, friction is meant to preserve checks and balances. For example, the fair
adjudication of asylum claims necessarily requires an outcome whittled from the sharpened
perspectives of a border patrol agent charged with border security, an asylum officer trained
to detect credible fears of persecution, and an impartial immigration judge who balances the
need for enforcement with humanitarian considerations. The agencies, in this case ICE
(within the DHS) and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) (within the
DOJ), can productively engage in bilateral negotiations that produce a MOU regarding the
treatment of their shared subjects. See Part II.B.3.
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administration are not the same and should not be conflated. As the
following subsections demonstrate, after disaggregating public
administration and public policy, the two parts can be rejoined in a variety
of configurations that bear on the legitimacy of executive policy.
1. Constraining Spillovers from Presidential Policies
Sometimes presidential attempts to achieve policy coherence are
strategic, using agency procedures to accomplish substantive goals.
Sometimes executive policy is the unintended effect of public
administration. That is, the President's Article II supervisory duties-
promoting a coherent policy agenda, controlling agency discretion, and
coordinating across the executive branch-can "spillover" into this setting
and shape public policies affecting third parties. Often this occurs through
indirect and decentralized means. The appropriate constraints depend on
which type of policy spillover is in play and whether executive action is the
first or last resort.95
When policy spillover is deliberate, external checks play an important
part. Usually, agencies engage in policy through the exercise of delegated
power from Congress or the President. So long as these delegations are
intelligible and the agency promulgates rules in a manner consistent with
administrative procedure, the resulting rules have the force of law.96 Courts
set limits on agency action by policing the bounds of executive authority.9 7
Policy spillover can be inadvertent, when it is inextricable from
administrative choices. For example, presidents can indirectly influence
policy beyond the agency by making decisions to defer or forbear from
taking action under statutory mandate.98 Generally, judicial review of these
enforcement decisions is deferential.9 9  Requirements for the agencies
implementing these decisions are similarly loose.o00  The Obama
95. In the context of agency rulemaking, for example, case law has developed tests for
judging substantial impact on regulated entities or revealing encoded substantive values. See,
e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n. v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
96. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Indus. Union
Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
97. Some classic examples of separation of powers cases include LNS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (prohibiting legislative veto) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
98. See generally Dan Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016); David
Barron and Tod Rakoff In Defense ofBig Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2013).
99. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
100. Consider APA exceptions to notice-and-comment procedures for internal
deliberations and rules of agency organization practice and procedure. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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Administration's DOJ pronouncement that it would forgo enforcement of
federal marijuana laws in states that have legalized marijuana furnishes an
example.'o' The immigration actions to forbear from ' deporting
undocumented immigrants who have long resided in the United States, an
example studied in Part II, furnish another. Internal constraint is
important to counter these policy spillovers.
Policy resulting from indirect pathways of influence, such as the
President's enlistment of actors who are not legally bound to obey under
their congressional mandate or directive authority, are harder to
constrain.10 2 The President can direct an agency to issue informal policies
in pursuit of its legal mandate, such as when an agency aims to provide
guidance about its anticipated interpretation of a statute or enforcement
approach. 03 The President can plug implementation gaps and smooth
coordinative hiccups that interfere with a coherent and functioning
policy.10 4 Modest policy innovations can accumulate over time to create
national policy.o 5 Or the President can advance schemes of cooperative
federalism that elicit voluntary cooperation from states.106 In an era of
decentralized governance, the President can endeavor to cabin the
discretion of those with attenuated relationships.o 7
Although it is not usually normatively desirable, the President sometimes
101. See generally Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle (U. Denver, Legal Research Paper No.
16-19, 2016); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671
(2014).
102. There is a lively debate over whether presidential control over the agency is
limited if a statute delegates authority to an agency as opposed to the President. For an
overview of the debate, see Strauss, supra note 15.
103. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (notice-and-comment procedures are not required "for
interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice"). These informal forms of administrative law, quintessentially intrnal, can
nevertheless have weighty effects on the external world. See William Funk, A Primer on
Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321 (200 1); Jill E. Family, Easing the Guidance Document
Dilemma Agency by Agency, 47 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 1 (2013).
104. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015).
105. Heather Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889
(2013-2014).
106. States' enactment of policies that extend driver's licenses to immigrants with
deferred action status is one example. Chen, Beyond Legality, supra note 13. State and local
resistance to immigration detainer requests is another. See Chen, Trust in Immigration
Enforcement, supra note 13; see also Part II.B.2.
107. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, supra note 10, at 1848 (isolating
decentralization as a quality of new governance).
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engages in, or insists upon, unilateral policymaking across the executive
branch under special circumstances, such as when a rapid response is
required, when a uniform response is required, or when a matter uniquely
concerns the president as a figurehead for the nation state. 08  The
President might be able to invoke inherent or emergency powers to take
action without the assent of Congress. 0 9  This type of institutional
leapfrogging raises special concerns, some of which may not be avoidable in
the first instance. Even in these cases, the President can normalize
policymaking by coordinating catch-up opportunities for institutional
realignment in agencies. For example, a president can encourage Congress
to follow up his executive action with legislative action to enact the same
policy or he can encourage an agency to codify customary practice or
informal agreement in the form of a regulation."10 While this requires
additional steps and takes longer than moving forward unilaterally, inviting
more process re-inserts the procedural checks that imbue administrative
action with legitimacy and induce cooperation.
At the end of the day, in normal circumstances, presidential influence
over attenuated policies depends on persuasion rather than control. It may
not always succeed. Bolstering the chances of success requires that the
lever of executive influence be regarded as trustworthy and procedurally
legitimate. When legitimacy is lacking, persuasion is elusive-even when
the substantive goals of a policy might be otherwise unobjectionable.
2. Permitting Internal Dissent Within Agencies
Executive action is vulnerable to abuse, especially in the midst of
political division that makes its use all the.more likely. This is especially
true in the area of immigration law or national security where external
constraint gives way to executive power due to the primacy of the President
108. A distinction can be drawn between unilateral presidential action and the unitary
executive theory. For an overview of unitary executive theory and a description of the
debate surrounding it, see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 35.
109. Pozen, supra note 33.
110. Following passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986,
which legalized a broad segment of the undocumented population, Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush used their executive authority to protect a group that
Congress left out of the legislation-the spouses and children of individuals who were in the
process of legalizing-from deportation. For more information about the Family Fairness
Act, see American Immigration Council, Reagan-Bush Family Fairness: A Chronological Histog
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/reagan-bush-family-fairness-
chronological-history.
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in both areas. Constraints on executive power are integral to safeguarding
its legality and establishing its legitimacy.I'
Emerging scholarship calls attention to the need for internal constraints
that separate power within an agency and permit checking and balancing
within the executive branch."i 2 These constraints can be legal or political.
Scholarship on internal legal constraints focuses on allocations of power
within the agency, the role of agency heads in coordinating agency
operations, and bureaucratic controls.113 Of all of the political constraints,
executive oversight, such as OIRA regulatory review, receives the most
attention as a means for policing regulatory excess. 114  Even without
executive oversight (or with voluntary submission to such oversight),
agencies can engage in self-regulation by issuing explanations and
justifications for their regulatory actions in the preambles to their guidance
I 11. Chen, Beyond Legality, supra note 13.
112. See Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatoy Rivals, supra note 10; Jon
Michaels, An Enduring Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015); see also
Farber & O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, supra note 89. Additional literature discusses
political control of agencies and the relationship between civil servants and political
leadership in several contexts. See Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within, 40 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 601 (2013); Alex Hemmer, Civil Servant Suits, 124 YALE L.J. 758, 773-74 (2014). Less
relevant to executive agencies, yet important to the broader area of inquiry is the norm
against interference with independent commissions.
113. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 89; Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, supra note 52;
Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 214 (2015); Bijal Shah, Uncovering
Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARv. L. REV. 805 (2014). Katyal, supra note 89 (State
Department dissent cable as channel for elevating agency staff concerns against political
leadership); MASHAW, CREATING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6; see also
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 27 (on professionalism and organizational
logics); Chen, Where rou Stand, supra note 86; Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009); see also Deacon, supra note 98 (exercises of discretion).
114. The voluminous literature on OIRA regulatory review involving cost-benefit
analysis is an example of executive oversight. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investgation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 830 (2003);
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1986); John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatog
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 995-97 (2006);
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
3 (1995); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064-69 (1986); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing
Centralized White House Regulatov Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012). For
purposes of this Article, the intervention of a White House office such as OIRA is classified
as "internal" to the executive branch, rather than external to the agency itself.
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or regulations.' 15  While not legally binding, the articulation and
deliberation of these justifications can by itself improve the quality of
decisionmaking and the effectiveness of governance. This call to look inside
agencies for constraints seeks to bolster the legitimacy of executive action by
grounding it in sound public administration.
3. Avoiding Excessive Coordination Across Agencies
The forces brought to bear on the President from outside the executive
branch-that is, from Congress, courts, states, foreign governments and
private organizations engaged in non-administrative activism-comprise
external controls on agency action.' 1 6 Administrative law scholarship is
particularly preoccupied with control from the outside-in."t7  These
constraints separate rulemaking powers so that legislative functions reside in
Congress, executive functions in the presidency (extending to his appointed
officers in agencies), and judicial functions in the courts. Violations of the
legislative-executive divide are managed through Congress's limits on
delegation of authority to agencies, prohibition of legislative vetoes of
agency actions, or restrictions on the President's ability to appoint and
remove agency personnel." 8  Congress checks presidential power, either
through substantive legislation, procedural laws such as the APA, or
processes of oversight and appropriations.1 9
115. Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252 (2016).
116. This definition comes from Aziz Z. Huq & Jon Michaels, The Cycles of Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE LJ. 346 (2016) (describing thick political surround); cf
Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship, supra note 37, 428-29 (describing external constraints
on agencies as courts, Congress, and the President).
117. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, supra note 7; Rubenstein, Black Box Immigration
Federalism, supra note 7.
118. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (describing
nondelegation doctrine and case law). Congress can use organic statutes to determine the
jurisdiction of the agency as well. See INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (prohibiting
legislative veto). The major removal cases concern removal of agency officials for-cause in
independent agencies. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010). The President's
appointment and removal powers for executive agencies is typically broader than for
independent agencies, with officers serving at the pleasure of the President.
119. The APA procedures aim to restrain agencies' ability to act without accountability
to Congress and the public. APA compliance with § 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures, for example, provides the agency with the best information, provides private
interests an opportunity to be heard, and ensures public knowledge of agency intentions.
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Judicial review by courts serves to reinforce the structural constraints on
executive action.1 20 Courts also ensure respect for substantive constraints
such as Due Process that balance the need for regulation against the
amount of process required to respect individual rights.121 Similarly, states
can ensure the rights of private parties when federalism and policy spillover
intrude on a private parties' constitutional rights.
While external constraints are undoubtedly necessary to constrain a
powerful president, these constraints can be more formal than functional.1 22
Also, exceptions to political and legal review made for matters of internal
administration exist. 123 Consequently, it is difficult to justify presidential
administration based on the institutions that surround it without also
expecting more from the White House and the agencies themselves.1 24
These voluntary steps to temper executive overreach from the inside-out
are based on an administrator's concern for fairness and procedural
legitimacy. Attention to procedure that is undertaken for non-instrumental
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)-(3) (2012). These procedures bolster expertise and reason-giving, as
well as transparency, in agency rulemaking. Id.
120. Courts review a range of agency actions adopted under the APA and organic
statutes empowering agencies to implement statutes. Typically, statutory interpretation is
laid out by the agency and then reviewed by courts using different degrees of deference for
statutory interpretation, factfinding, and policy judgments. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
121. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
122. The merit of the external constraints is that they maintain formalist conceptions of
separated powers that use inter-branch competition to check excesses of power. Some say
that they provide political accountability or promote reason-giving and expertise in agencies
through the borrowed power of Congress and courts. However, on structural constraints,
despite the nondelegation doctrine, delegation of legislative authority to agencies is typically
broad and does not constrain very much agency action. Am. Tmcking Ass'n Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(noting that nondelegation case law has only struck down delegations on two occasions).
Challenges to legislative vetoes or restrictions on the President's ability to appoint and
remove agency personnel do not constrain very much agency action either. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 919 (prohibiting legislative veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding
that once an agency officer is confirmed by the Senate, Congress's ability to remove the
official is limited to impeachment).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (creating an exception for "a matter relating to agency
management"); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (creating an exception for "rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice"); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (creating an exception for
"interpretive rules, general statements of policy").
124. See Part III for examples of the kinds of executive oversight and agency self-
regulation that might help.
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reasons can foster the legitimacy of administrative action even more
effectively than controls from the outside.
II. CASE STUDIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR-IN-CHIEF FROM
IMMIGRATION JAW
Three case studies follow. They each show President Obama acting as
the Administrator-in-Chief in the area of immigration law. Each case study
traces the process development for a specific policy and highlights the three
basic tasks of internal administration described as conditions for legitimate
presidential intervention into agency policy. Though all three conditions
appear in each case study, a defining feature is highlighted within each case
study to permit in-depth analysis. The cases vary in terms of policy
orientation and policymaking form. The purpose of including cross-case
variation is to sketch the parameters of the theory that the President stands
on his firmest ground when exercising the three C's, regardless of the policy
orientation or policymaking form.1 25 The in-case analysis supports the
insight that a president can succeed or fail in his administrative functions,
even within the context of a single policy. 126
Each case study combines information and analysis from a variety of
print sources, including journalistic reports, community advocacy,
academic scholarship, government sources, and in-depth interviews with
government officials and immigration advocates. Although no single
official can speak for the m6lange of motivations behind an agency's policy
and the small size of the sample does not serve the purpose of
representativeness, these selective interviews provide insight into the
internal perspectives of key decisionmakers within the agency.1 27 My own
observations and insights from administrative theories of institutional
design, presidential control, and bureaucratic discretion also inform the
analysis. 128
125. Although a case study comparison cannot generate the same type of testable
hypothesis as a quantitative study or formal design, case study comparisons permit causal
inferences and can be especially valuable for process tracing and the development of
conceptual typologies. ALEXANDER GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND
THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2005).
126. For example, President Obama was more successful with DACA than DAPA, less
successful with Secure Communities than its successor PEP. For more discussion within case
analyses, see id.
127. Jennifer Hochschild, Conducting Intensive Interviews and Elite Interviews, Workshop on
Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research (2009).
128. For each case study, I spoke with two or three former or current immigration
officials within DHS or its sub-agencies. I also spoke with immigration attorneys familiar
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The case studies begin with a preliminary section describing the
statutory framework and organizational infrastructure of the immigration
bureaucracy for context.
A. Mapping the Immzgyation Bureaucracy
The immigration-related agencies of the regulatory state are mostly
housed in DHS. It is a young agency, and a sprawling one. Following
September 11, 2001, twenty-two agencies were consolidated into DHS
under President George W. Bush, making President Obama the first
Democratic President to govern it.129
Among the key features of institutional reform was a functional division
of service to immigrants in USCIS from the enforcement of immigration
laws by Border Patrol and ICE. The adjudicative functions were isolated
from DHS and instead placed in the DOJ Executive Office of Immigration
Review, which houses the immigration courts and Bureau of Immigration
Appeals. Faced with intensifying demands for immigration enforcement,
the scope and size of these immigration-related agencies has grown on
every measure-staff, number of deportations, range of operations,
statutory grounds for deportation-albeit unevenly. 30  The agency
missions sometimes complement, but sometimes compete for jurisdiction.
The resulting structure of the immigration bureaucracy is often
described as unwieldy, inefficient, and ineffective. Criticism of the structure
of the DHS has a history. Its predecessor, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), suffered longstanding institutional design
problems. 131 Insufficient funding, institutional fragmentation, lack of clarity
about mission or internally contradictory missions, and poor workplace
with the policies. All interviews were conducted off-the-record unless specific permission
was granted for attribution. IRB clearance for these interviews was granted in connection
with Protocol 16-0484 exemptions 2, 3 at University of Colorado.
129. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, §201(f)(2)(g), §402(3)
(2012) (Granting the President the Authority to Transfer Agencies to be under DHS
auspices; transferring ICE responsibility to DHS). The major statute governing immigration
law is the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). INA § 103 grants broad authority to
the Secretary of Homeland Security (formerly the Attorney General when INS was part of
the DOJ), who "shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act and all
other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
130. See Stephanie Francis Ward, As Funding for Immigration Enforcement Increases, So Will
Court Backlog, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
as-funding-forjimmigration-enforcement increases-sowillcourtbackl.
131. See generally KrrTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE (1992); MILTON MORRIS,
IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY (1985).
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culture, especially for line officers, were the result.1 32  Many of the
institutional problems remain after the DHS reorganization following 9/11.
Judge Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, who prepared a presidential transition
report for President Obama before joining the bench, discusses
organizational fragmentation between (1) DHS and DOJ and (2) within the
three branches of the DHS.133 Efforts to overcome the intra-agency and
inter-agency fragmentation are ongoing. 34
DHS confronts additional challenges, beyond institutional design.
Agency culture impacts the capacity and motivation of the agency to
deliver on its mission, and DHS's reputation for low morale is legion. 35
The agency is additionally constrained by the high-profile nature of the
immigration and the political sensitivities surrounding it. Entrenchment
makes it politically costly to back down on immigration enforcement. Shifts
can and do occur. For example, President Obama shifted enforcement
efforts away from the worksite raids used during the Bush administration
toward "criminal aliens." 3 6 President Trump has shifted toward terrorism
and national security threats. 3 7  As Judge Cu61ar noted, limited
presidential control over the bureaucracy is a consequence of these
institutional and cultural constraints.13 8
Apart from structure and culture, the President's limited powers over the
immigration bureaucracy are partly explained by the lack of resources
available that the President commands relative to the scope of the agency's
mandate. Although the President can make recommendations to the
agency, Congress passes the budget. 3 9 For many years, Congress's budget
132. Id. at 87-94.
133. MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUtLIAR, GOVERNING SECURITY: THE HIDDEN ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN SECURITY AGENCIES (2013).
134. See, e.g., DHS, DHS UNITY OF EFFORT INITIATIVE 2014,
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/11/16/statement-secretary-johnson-inspector-generals-
report-dhs-management.
135. Numerous interviews spoke to agency morale. See, e.g., interviews with DHS
General Counsel officials (May 30, 2016; May, 31, 2016, 6; June 5, 2016). See also Jerry
Markon, Homeland Security Ranks Dead Last in Morale-Again-But Jeh Johnson's Morale Is High,
WASH. PosT (Sep. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/wp/2015 /09/29/dhs-disappointed-by-latest-low-morale-scores-vows-to-keep-trying/
(reporting survey of government morale that shows DHS at lowest government-wide).
136. CutLLAR, supra note 133, at 53.
137. Exec. Order No. 13, 769 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017)
138. CUtLLAR, supra note 133, at 57.
139. See Pasachoff, supra note 10 (describing use of budget to control policy, including
OMB prioritization of existing resources); Mark Jia, Immigration Law---Office of Legal Counsel
Issues Opinion Endorsing President Obama's Executive Order on Deferred Action for Parental
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could not keep pace with the scale of immigration enforcement. The
government had the capacity to remove less than 4% of the 11.3 million
undocumented immigrants living inside the United States, even at the
historically high level of 400,000 removals each year.1 40 The congressional
purse strings on the spending of the budget also influence the ability of the
agency to allocate the resources that it receives toward its various
programs.141 Congress's detention bed mandate calling for 34,000 beds in
250 facilities across the country, per day, is commonly linked to DHS's
enforcement metrics. 142
In the face of resource limitations, President Obama's deferred action
policies tackled the undocumented immigrant population from two sides.
First, through a variety of executive actions, the President announced
enforcement priorities, beginning in 2011 with the ICE Director John
Morton's memo increasing the priority of criminal history 43 and
continuing in 2014 with the DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson's comparable
memo adding recently-arrived immigrants.1 44 Second, on the de-
prioritization side, President Obama used executive action to grant
deferred action and work permits to undocumented immigrants who are
long-term residents. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program is the most notable deferred action program that provides
relief for those who arrived many years ago at a young age.' 4 5 These
Accountabiliy-The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 128 HARv. L. REV. 2320,
2323 (2015).
140. The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38
Op. O.L.C., at 1 (Nov. 19, 2014) (acknowledging DHS statistics on enforcement capabilities
given current resources).
141. Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov.
19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-known-immigration-man
date-keeps-detention-beds-full.
142. Id.
143. ICE Director John Morton Memo on Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities
(Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-
discretion/civil-imm-enforcement-prioritiesapp-detn-reml-aliens.pdf
144. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson Memo on Policies for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Priorities
Memo], https: //www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 1411 20_memo.prosecutor
ial_discretion.pdf
145. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (2012) [hereinafter
DAPA Memo], https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-child
hood-arrivals-daca. The 2014 DAPA memo was never put into effect, following a
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interlocking priorities set in motion our three case studies of the President
acting as Administrator-in-Chief: deferred action for long-time
undocumented residents, detainers to transfer "criminal aliens" into
removal proceedings, and border control against recent arrivals.
B. Case Studies of the President as Administrator-in-Chief in Immigration Law
President Obama's administration relied on a strategy of prioritized
enforcement to manage the clash of broad legislative mandates and limited
resources. Building on selective practices of discretion, his DHS Secretaries
issued memos outlining positive and negative priorities for the agency.1 46
The articulation of these priorities serves administrative functions and
carries implications for immigration policy beyond the agency.
Importantly, these policies and programs resulted from nonbinding
agency actions, not executive orders as they were often characterized in
public discussion.1 47 The policies were issued through nonbinding policy
statements and memoranda that can be collectively categorized as
guidance;1 48 though they are sometimes layered atop existing regulations. 49
nationwide injunction left in effect by a 4-4 Supreme Court decision in Texas v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2771 (2016).
146. Morton memo 2011, supra note 143; Johnson Priorities Memo 2014, supra note
144.
147. The Federal Register Act requires that executive orders and proclamations be
published in the Federal Register. Id. Furthermore, executive orders must comply with
preparation, presentation, and publication requirements. 44 U.S.C. §1505 (2012). The
distinction between an executive order and an executive action, a broader term
encompassing agency guidance memos, is described in VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS20846, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND
REVOCATION (2014).
148. For example, the 2012 DACA program and the 2014 DAPA program relief on
DHS agency guidance. See, e.g., Janet Napolitano, DHS Sec'y, Memorandum Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/memorandum-deferred-action-
process-young-people-who-are-low-enforcement-priorities; Jeh Johnson, DHS Sec'y,
Memorandum Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came
to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who are the
Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 14_1120_memo-deferred action.pdf.
149. The immigration detainer program that replaced Secure Communities in 2014
was announced through guidance; however, the underlying use of detainers had been
promulgated by agency regulations years ago. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, DHS
Sec'y, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv. (USCIS), on
Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Secure Communities Memo],
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Although President Obama invested considerable energy in crafting,
implementing, and defending them, they were not claimed to be binding
presidential directives or executive orders. 50 Rather, President Obama's
policies relied on partnerships with other agencies, Congress, and states. 151
The three case studies of immigration policy during the Obama
administration illustrate the dimensions and dynamics of a president acting
as an administrator-in-chief. The case studies were chosen for their
theoretical import and also their ongoing contemporary interest. The first
case study, USCIS's administration of DACA, concerns a policy of
immigrant inclusion and temporary deportation relief with a strong
operational dimension driven by the need for resource allocation. The
second and third case studies concern exclusionary enforcement measures
to advance policies of crime control and border control. The ICE policies
on immigration detainers evince a strong internal operational dimension by
drawing up discretionary criteria for detainers to pair presidential priorities
with congressional objectives, while also bolstering agency effectiveness in
increasing detention and removal. The border crackdown for recent
arrivals lacks as strong an operational core given that the policy was forged
in the midst of a migration crisis that the existing infrastructure proved ill-
equipped to address.1 52
1. Using Guidance to Provide Administrative Relief to Undocumented Immigrants
The most well-known example of executive administration in
immigration is President Obama's attempt to provide temporary relief from
deportation to long undocumented immigrants through deferred action. In
the thirty years since Congress's last legalization, the population of long-
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memosecurecommunitie
s.pdf.
150. See generally, Jorge Ramos & Brett LoGuirato, Obama Defends His Record on
Immigration to Jorge Ramos, FUSION (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:59 PM), http://fusion.net/video/32969/
watch-obama-spars-with-jorge-ramos-on-immigration/; Alicia Montgomery, President Obama
Defends His Record on Race, NPR (July 1, 2016) http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/
2016/06/28/483873682/president-obama-defends-his-record-on-race; David A. Martin, A
lawfid Step for the Immigration System, WASH. POST (June 24, 2012) https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/a-lawful-step-for-the-immigration-
system/2012 /06/24/gJQAgTOOOV story.html?utm-term=. 1 c641701 Oed2.
151. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gentle White House Nudges Test the Power of Persuasion, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/health/policy/
24persuade.html.
152. These very different programs are studied in two prior articles. See generally Chen,
Beyond Legality, supra note 13; Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement, supra note 13.
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time undocumented immigrants grew to 11.3 million.153 President Obama
lacked the resources and will to deport them all. After several failed efforts
for legislative reform and under pressure from community groups, the
President announced his decision to allocate more resources to the benefits-
granting component of DHS, USCIS, through the creation of DACA in
2012 and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) in 2014.154
The story of deferred action is one of a president engaging in the agenda-
setting and resource allocations functions of public administration, with
some success. It is also the story of an operational policy on a morally
contentious issue being undone by procedural deficiencies in the face of
substantive controversy.
In 2012 and 2014 respectively, the President prompted his DHS
Secretaries-first, Janet Napolitano and then Jeh Johnson-to work with
USCIS to promulgate agency guidance consistent with his reprioritization
goals. The priority memos packaged together numerous policies in an
effort to rationalize and modernize the chaotic enforcement from prior
administrations. The 2012 DACA memo lowered the priority of young
people who migrated without documents as children, were younger than
age thirty-one before June 15, 2012, and have resided continuously in the
U.S. since their entry.1 55 The 2014 DAPA memo lowers the priority of
undocumented immigrants with U.S. citizen and legal permanent resident
children based on similar equities of long-term and continuous residence.156
The deferred action programs drew directly upon longstanding practices
of exercising prosecutorial discretion in individual removal cases.'5 7 The
programs were consequential on many measures. DACA provided
beneficiaries with increased educational and economic opportunities, and it
153. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW
RESEARCH CENT. (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-
facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.
154. See supra notes 128-29.
155. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, USCIS Guidance (last visited Feb.
18, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca#guidelines.
156. SeeJohnson Priorities Memo, supra note 144; USCIS, Executive Actions on Immzgration,
https://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last updated April 15, 2015). The 2014 memo
encompassed DAPA and also an expansion of DACA (higher age cap and three-year, rather
than two-year deferral), though the paper consolidates discussion of DACA 2014 and DAPA
2014. Id.
157. Immigration advocates initiated numerous FOIA requests before obtaining
information about the practice of prosecutorial discretion prior to Obama's 2012
announcement of the DACA program. See SHOBA WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE
ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 1-2 (2015).
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touched off a wave of state legislation to further incorporate these
immigrants into society, including becoming eligible for driver's licenses, in-
state tuition, and even health care. 58 DACA 2014 and DAPA would have
taken a similar path; however, it was blocked from implementation by a
federal district court injunction left in place by an evenly-divided Supreme
Court.'59
Certain components of the DACA memo were substantive, such as
announcing values and priorities for enforcement; other components were
operational. The memo codified existing criteria without changing their
substance or altering removal priorities. It systematized the process for
considering deferrals by producing application forms and compliance
manuals, and it created service centers to process the applications.1 60 While
it facilitated the award of certain benefits such as the Employment
Authorization Document (EAD) that granted permission to work, it did not
create new benefits; EADs were previously codified by a regulation under
the Reagan Administration.' 6 ' DACA functioned as the missing link for
recipients to obtain identity cards from states and other entities willing to
provide them, though it did not compel those benefits. 6 2 Like its successor
program, it did not create a new legal status.16 3
Though there is certainly substantive policy involved in deprioritizing
enforcement against a category of individuals, agency officials also
understood the point of the guidance was to deal with internal,
bureaucratic, and pragmatic problems with creating a coherent
enforcement strategy with insufficient resources. As between ICE and
USCIS, resource allocations shifted away from enforcement and toward the
provision of administrative relief. In interviews, numerous government
officials described the need to reprioritize DHS resources among its
158. National UnDACAmented Research Project reports consistently show increased
education, job placement, and income for DACA recipients. See generally NATIONAL
UNDACAMENTED RESEARCH PROJECT, http://dacastudy.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
159. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex., 2015) (granting Plaintiffs
motion for a preliminary injunction).
160. See Cox & Rodriguez, Redux 1, supra note 41.
161. 8 C.F.R. § 274(a.2) (2012).
162. Id. This account is challenged in the Texas v. United States litigation, wherein states
asserted that they were compelled to provide driver's licenses to DACA beneficiaries at a
cost to the state. 787 F.3d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 2015).
163. The issue of creating a new status through the lawful presence designation is taken
up in DAPA, which the Supreme Court scrutinized during oral argument in United States v.
Texas. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2015).
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component agencies.1 64 USCIS was primarily responsible for administering
DACA.165 Compared to other DHS agencies, it was small in size and had a
limited budget.1 66 Some senior officials called it the "runt of the litter." 6 7
The resource shift forged inter-departmental conflict, placing USCIS
and ICE at odds with one another in their exercises of discretion. 68
Professor Michael Kagan describes the conflict between line officers at ICE
and the political leadership at DHS, positing that the struggle over
immigration policy exists, "on one side, the President and his appointed
agency heads, who have sought to use prosecutorial discretion to shield
many unauthorized immigrants from deportation" and, on the other side,
"frontline immigration enforcement officers and their union representatives
who do not agree with the President's agenda." 69 Kagan's article and
subsequent writings present rich descriptions of the intransigence of ICE
officers in the face of the DHS priorities memos that made long-time
undocumented residents an unlikely target for removal.1 70  Similar
descriptions appear in other accounts of the inner workings of ICE.'7' ICE
and USCIS's battle came to the fore in the ICE officers' vote of no
confidence for their political leadership and the filing of Crane v. Johnson.172
164. Interviews with USCIS and DHS General Counsel officials (May 30, 2016; May,
31, 2016;June 5, 2016).
165. USCIS is the benefits granting agency within the DHS.
166. Since a 1989 appropriations bill created the Immigration Examination Fees
Account, USCIS is funded by user fees rather than congressional appropriations. WILUAM
KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44038, USCIS FUNDING AND ACCOUNTABIuTY TO
CONGRESS (Feb. 19, 2015).
167. Interviews with USCIS officials (May 31, 2016).
168. Interview with DHS officials (July 5, 2016).
169. See Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind
President Obama's Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 667 (2016).
170. Id. at 684-89 (focusing on front line resistance); see also Michael Kagan, U.S. v.
Texas-Some Observations as the Briefing Begins, YALEJ. ON REG. L. & REG. PRAC.: NOTICE AND
COMMENT BLOG (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/u-s-v-texas-some-
observations-as-the-briefing-begins (describing the U.S. government's defense of DACA and
DAPA as an attempt to control the "idiosyncratic Behavior of DHS Agents").
171. See Hiroshi Motomura, President's Dilemma, Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule
of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN LJ. 1, 23-24 (2015) (discussing "who" the within
executive branch gets to exercise discretion); Ahilan Arulantham, The President's Relief Program
as a Response to Insurrection, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2014/11 /the-presidents-relief-program-as.html; see also Cox & Rodriguez, Redux 1, supra
note 41, at 530-32; Cox & Rodriguez, Redux 2, supra note 61, at 187-88; Hemmer, supra
note 112, at 772-74 (2014).
172. 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013). The Crane lawsuit challenged the 2012
DACA program by the State of Mississippi and several ICE officers on the grounds that the
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Although the legal challenge was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing
and subject matter jurisdiction, it unveiled internal dissent toward President
Obama's immigration policies along political and career staff lines.173
Within USCIS, increased resource allocations enabled greater efficiency,
consistency, and predictability in the granting of individualized claims for
relief. President Obama's allocation of greater resources for USCIS
allowed it to increase hiring for processing DACA applications and
rationalize the individualized exercises of discretion. This hiring authority
also presented opportunities to diversify the overall composition of the staff.
USCIS is the benefits-granting agency within DHS, which might give the
impression that it consists of a pro-immigrant staff. However, many of the
long-time civil servants in USCIS began as trial attorneys in the INS legacy
agency, where they were tasked with enforcement rather than services.174
Others came to USCIS for reasons unrelated to the agency mission, such as
higher prestige or salaries. 75 In contrast, newly-hired USCIS attorneys
came into the agency for the express purpose of furthering the agency's
DACA mandate.1 76 The net effect was to broaden the ideological
composition of the office to include those who embraced the President's
strategy of following institutional enforcement priorities rather than
pursuing every policy with equal force.' 7 7
Still USCIS's organizational culture of following rules literally could not
easily be overcome. In this respect, the USCIS shared the law enforcement
exercise of prosecutorial discretion interfered with officers' oaths of office to execute and
defend the law. Amended Complaint, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 3:12-
cv-03247-O). Crane, representing the government employee union, apparently resented
that their discretion to depart from headquarters' priorities was being taken away in the
DACA memo that "established a system that mandates that the nation's most fundamental
immigration laws are not enforced." See Andrew Becker, Tension Over Obama Policies Within
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20 10/08/26/AR2010082606561. html; Julia Preston,
Agents' Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimes-focus-of-
deportation.html.
173. See Becker, supra note 172.
174. Interviews with officials in the USCIS office (May 5, 2016). DHS officials relayed
to me that the service-side of the reformulated USCIS attracted some attorneys not because
of mission but because of better opportunities for professional advancement and salary. Id.
17 5. Id.
17 6. Id.
177. Id. DHS officials relayed to me that the service-side of the reformulated USCIS
attracted some attorneys not because of mission but because of better opportunities for
professional advancement and salary. Id.
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mindset of its sister agencies.1 78 As one former INS official told me, in the
years preceding DACA and DAPA, USCIS attorneys routinely issued
Notices to Appear upon denial of immigration benefits, even for non-
threatening situations like missing a one-year filing deadline for asylum.' 79
The effect was to transform immigration benefits cases into enforcement
cases without evaluating the case from the perspective of the agency's
enforcement strategy. 8 0 Interviews with government officials in USCIS
referred to changing the mindset of non-discretion as part of the
considerable "spade work" that needed to be undertaken before DACA.181
Articulating the affirmative criteria for deferred action as programmatic
criteria encouraged individual line officers to consider agency-wide factors
in their determinations about individual applications for relief.1 82
Still President Obama's attempt to expand DACA with the issuance of
DAPA in 2014 tested the extent to which hearts and minds had been
changed. President Obama appointed as DHS Secretary, Jeh Johnson, a
well-respected lawyer without strong policy priors on immigration
enforcement.18 3  President Obama charged Secretary Johnson with
extending administrative relief. Secretary Johnson spent the bulk of his
early months in office on a memo outlining avenues of administrative relief.
He exchanged multitudes of drafts with the White House and consulted
with varied interest groups, from business to immigration to labor, in
closed-door meetings. 184 The result was a policy modeled on DACA, with
a few significant expansions. DAPA was broader in scope and scale than
DACA, rendering twice as many undocumented immigrants eligible for
temporary relief and using criteria that exceeded prior legislative proposals
for a DREAM Act. DAPA was more controversial in its inclusion of adults
who, though possessing positive equities, were less sympathetic than the
DACA youth who were not culpable for the decision to migrate without
documentation. DAPA, unlike DACA, named lawful presence and more
178. See Thomas W. Donovan, The American Immigration System, 17 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L.
574, 574 (2005) (noting USCIS is tasked with conferring benefits to the immigrant
community and other missions might be incompatible).
179. Interview with former INS official (Aug. 2016).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Ann Palmer et al., How Obama Got Here, PoorrIco (Nov. 20, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11 /how-obama-got-here- 113077.
184. By one count, the White House collaboration with the DHS administration
produced more than 60 drafts in 8 months by this point. Id.; see also Interview with
immigration attorney (June 6, 2016).
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strongly supported the award of associated benefits.185 This last expansion
proved the most consequential, exacerbating procedural deficiencies in
DACA in the face of heightening division. 186
As when DACA was first introduced, the introduction of DAPA was
resisted by ICE agents and in field offices.18 The agents subtly resisted
training. Secretary Johnson's reminders of their duty to follow the new
priorities were rebuked and complained about in the national media. 88
While these intra-agency tensions were scarcely mentioned by the
government in its defense of DAPA during Texas v. United States,'8 9
Washington insiders and veterans of immigration policy report that these
internal forces were strong and had been long festering. 9 0
In addition, the use of incremental fixes to pursue ambitious policy
changes rendered the policies vulnerable to challenge from outside the
agency. By 2014, partisan rancor among elected officials reached a boiling
point. Congressional resistance to President Obama's 2012 executive
action exacerbated stalemate on continued immigration reform. To the
frustration of community activists, the President played into the political
maneuvering by delaying taking further executive action until the 2014
midterm elections.191 The delay proved unfortunate because by the time
185. DAPA Memo,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/pubhlications/ 14_1120_memodeferred-action.pdf
; see alsoJosh Blackmun, DACA Unlike DAPA Does Not Confer "Lawful Presence", Josh Blackman's
Blog ("The phrase 'lawful presence' appears nowhere in the memorandum. In contrast, the
November 2014 memorandum establishing DAPA expressly noted that it conferred 'lawful
presence."'), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/03/14/daca-unlike-dapa-does-not-
confer-lawful-presence/.
186. Anil Kalhan, DAPA, "Lawful Presence" and the Illusion of a Problem, YALEJ. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (2016) (explaining how lawful presence became concern in
litigation over DAPA), http://yalejreg.com/nc/dapa-lawful-presence-and-the-illusion-of-a-
problem-by-anil-kalhan/.
187. Preston, supra note 172.
18 8. Id.
189. 787 F.3d 733, 745 (5th Cir. 2015).
190. Interviews with USCIS officials (May 30, 2016; May 31, 2016). The
fragmentation of the service and enforcement functions within the INS, the conflicts of
political leadership and civil servants, and confusion of shifting agency culture are not
unique to President Obama's immigration agencies. Id.
191. Interview with immigration attorney (June 6, 2016). Though President Obama
continued to promise immigration reform, President Obama did not want to jeopardize the
political chances of congressmen running in close races by angering voters who were not
enamored with the President's prior use of executive action. The concern became
particularly acute following the unexpected loss of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, who
had supported a piecemeal approach toward immigration reform. It was widely interpreted
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Congress and President Obama were ready to act, the window of
opportunity was closing.192 On November 20, 2014, President Obama
introduced DAPA in a televised speech, proclaiming that he would do
"everything in his power" to rectify the broken immigration law despite his
continuing preference for Congress to take action. 93  There was no
denying the political overtone. President Obama claimed credit for
enacting the substantive policy, even as he disclaimed his desire to use
administrative means. The response was political all-around: supporters
lauded the actions as "bold, courageous, and generous" 94 and opponents
derided it as executive overreach-an attempt by President Obama to
circumvent Congress in a way that runs afoul of separation of power values
and administrative procedures for rulemaking under the APA.95 Constant
comparisons between executive and legislative action underscored the view
that President Obama had engaged in policymaking and even
impermissible lawmaking.
The opponents' framing won. Almost immediately after the issuance of
DAPA in 2014, Speaker of the House John Boehner threatened to sue the
President for executive overreach, and the House of Representatives made
repeated attempts to cut funding for DACA implementation through
proposed appropriations bills.1 96 Texas led twenty-seven states in filing a
as a sign that Congress would not be able to secure comprehensive immigration reform and
resulted in even more pressure for the President to act. Id.
192. News had broken that a rush of Central Americans were fleeing violence by
crossing the southwestern border in record numbers. Compounding the pressure, the media
reported that some of the Central American asylum-seekers had heard of DHS Secretary
Janet Napolitano's 2012 memorandum and mistakenly believed they would be able to
remain in the U.S. notwithstanding their recent arrival. See Stephen Dinan, Surge in Illegal
Immigrants Blamed on U.S. Policy, Not on Spiking Violence in Central America, WASH. TIMES (June
11, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/11/surge-illegals-blamed-us-
policy/; see also supra Part II.B.3.
193. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, DHS Sec'y, to Thomas Winkowski, Acting
Dir., USCIS, on Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented
Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120 memo-prosecutorial-discretion.pdf.
194. Statement from Rep. Gutierrez (D-Ill.) who was a key supporter of the DREAM
Act and liaison to the White House. IMMIGRATION BATrLE. Dir. Shari Robertson and
Michael Camerini, (Frontline & Independent Lens 2015.).
195. Id.
196. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (2015) funded DHS
but restricted funds for DACA implementation. See H.R. 240, 114th Cong. (2015-2016)
(the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act which funded DHS but
restricted funds for DACA implementation became law); HR. 38, 114th Cong. (2015-2016)
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lawsuit in federal court for a preliminary injunction to bar implementation
against the DAPA program.1 97 Their challenge, Texas v. United States,
succeeded in the federal district court and the Fifth Circuit.1 98 As the case
proceeded through the federal courts, constitutional issues about the
President's power gave way to technical questions about administrative law
and the procedural validity of the USCIS guidance.199 Yet the political
overtones never relented. The district court decision used thinly-veiled
political rhetoric, alongside its technical legal analysis, to attack the motives
of the President and the operation of the program and the presiding judge
became embroiled in scrutiny over his own political motivations. 200 The
Fifth Circuit, consisting of two Republican-appointees and one Democratic
appointee, split along partisan lines when affirming the district court
opinion. 20 1 The refusal of Congress to fill a vacancy in the U.S. Supreme
Court in the face of uncertainty about the coming presidential election led
to a 4-4 impasse that left in place the lower court decisions, without
resolving the underlying controversy. 202 The election of a new president
who can unilaterally withdraw DACA and DAPA-with a stroke of the
same pen that created them-further underscores the limits of executive
action.
Rep. Ted Yoho (R-Fla.) introduced a bill titled "Preventing Executive Overreach on
Immigration Act" but it was not passed. Id.
197. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
198. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's initial injunction and merits
decisions in subsequent 2-1 decisions. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. at 677-78 (S.D. Tex.
2015), affd, 787 F.3d 733, (5th Cir 2015), affd, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (the U.S. Supreme
Court came to a 4-4 impasse in June 2016, issuing a one-sentence decision that deferred to
the Fifth Circuit's injunction on the program without offering justifications).
199. In particular, the Texas v. United States litigation focused on the appropriateness of
the Obama administration's decision to proceed without notice-and-comment rulemaking
while constructing a large-scale program with significant practical consequences for states
and employers, and potentially binding legal consequences. An amicus brief filed by a group
of prominent administrative law professors considered the DACA memo to fall into three
exemptions for notice-and-comment rulemaking: internal subject matter, guidance, and
grant or benefit. Brief United States, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners (United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674)).
200. Kalhan, DAPA, "Lawful Presence" and the Illusion of a Problem, supra note 186; Anil
Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive
Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58 (2015).
201. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d at 743 (Judges Smith and Elrod wrote the
majority opinion). Judge King filed a passionate dissent. Id. (KingJ., dissenting).
202. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2271 (2016) (per curiam), rehearing denied, 137
S. Ct. 285 (2016).
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In sum, the Obama administration converted a substantive policy
change into an operational imperative. The intermingling of
administrative procedure and substantive policy in DACA was risky,
though it survived political and legal attacks due to the popular support it
enjoyed. However, brewing partisan division engulfed the subsequent
expansion of deferred action in DAPA. This political ferment led to the
undoing of the program in a coordinated campaign involving the courts,
Congress, and the states. In the view of the President, the executive action
and USCIS guidance strove to set a coherent policy for the agency through
operational changes to resource allocation for enforcement. Perhaps
because of their successes with DACA, the Obama administration took
risks with DAPA, expanding the substantive reach of their executive power
without shoring up administrative procedure. Opponents in Congress and
Republican-led states vehemently disagreed with this administrative
exercise and pushed back. They emphasized the costs of policy spillover
effects from the guidance, especially costs borne by the states, over the
benefits of a well-functioning administration of immigration policy. While
policy spillovers are sometimes inevitable and not always problematic, in
the case of DAPA the conflation of operational needs with substantive
effects sowed confusion and acrimony. The acrimonious politics
surrounding deferred action in 2014 eroded what had, for a brief moment,
been a victory for public administration and that later became undone as
presidential policymaking. 203
2. Centralizing Discretion over Detention for "Criminal Aliens"
Presidential administration consists of more than operational
intervention to advance coherent policy. It also entails the President's
assertion of control over discretion to ensure consistent decisions-the
second task from the typology of internal administration. Two types of
discretion must be controlled for immigration detention: decisionmaking
within agencies to act on high priority flags by issuing detainer requests and
the independent judgment of states and localities who can choose whether
to cooperate with these detainer requests. 204 President Obama inherited
203. At the time of writing this Article, the Trump Administration has not indicated
whether it will end DACA. Maya Rhodan, DREAMers Face Uncertain Future After Confirmation
Hearings, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 12, 2017).
204. Cf Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FoRDHAM L. REV. 661, 694-97
(2015) (arguing that DACA was a "shift toward more systemic and categorical implantation
of enforcement discretion," and allowing for such prosecutorial discretion was an attempt to
establish more equitable enforcement in terms of deportation); Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful
Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PENN. L. REv. 1753, 1795-97 (2016) (analyzing the
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impressive machinery that could flag incarcerated persons with
immigration issues, which a vigorous ICE agency used to seek transfers of
these individuals to civil immigration detention. 205 He cultivated a network
of local law enforcement partners willing to cooperate with federal
immigration enforcement. 206  Both exercises of discretion served the
President's overarching goal of targeting "felons, not families" through his
enforcement priorities. As with deferred action, President Obama
attempted to recalibrate enforcement criteria. Within the category of
ccriminal aliens," he pushed ICE to focus on immigrants with serious
criminal offenses, rather than pursuing full enforcement against more
minor offenses. 207  In theory, this system of priorities ameliorated the
severity of ICE's enforcement strategy. However, the execution of these
priorities was clumsy and procedurally defective. The missteps fomented
distrust among community stakeholders that led to the rescission of the
program and doomed its replacement. 208
The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) was an enforcement policy that
prioritized the removal of noncitizens who have committed crimes. 209
different elements of DAPA to determine "whether [those] elements of DAPA truly reflect
an exercise of enforcement discretion."). See also Dan Cadman & Mark H. Metcalf, Disabling
Detainers: How the Obama Administration has Trashed a Key Immigration Enforcement Tool, CENTER
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, at 2 (Jan. 2015) ("Actions by state and local authorities that
frustrate federal authority by claiming compliance is discretionary appear to be
unconstitutional on their face.").
205. See ICE's Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Dismantling the BiggestJail to Deportation Pipeline,
IMMIGRATION LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, at 1 (2016) (noting that ICE utilizes CAP to
locate incarcerated persons who could potentially be deported and, based on this
information, will transfer these persons to immigration detention).
206. See Fiscal rear 2016 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, at 9 (2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Report/2016/removal-stats-2016.pdf, (noting that since the implementation of
the Priority Enforcement Program, state and local authorities have become more
cooperative with federal immigration authorities).
207. See John Morton, Memorandum: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens,
ICE, at 2 (Mar. 2, 2011) (identifying the priorities of apprehension based on the seriousness
of the crime committed), https:/ /www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011 /
11 0302washingtondc.pdf.
208. The motivations for DHS's use of detainers was the subject of disagreement in my
interviews. Agency insiders blamed Congress and attributed the program's failings to
organizational dysfunction; agency outsiders blamed DHS for its lack of transparency and a
substantive purpose that threatened constitutional norms of due process.
209. See ICE, CAP DESCRIPTION, https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program (last
visited on Feb. 21, 2017).
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CAP, created by Congress during the appropriations process, mandated
DHS's strong enforcement against this diverse category of immigrants that
includes legal permanent residents with serious criminal convictions and
immigrants whose only criminal offense is immigration-related. 2 0 DHS
required efficient and strong enforcement to meet specific numerical
benchmarks for detention and removal with allocated resources. 211
Operating through jails was a faster, cheaper, and safer way to meet
benchmarks than through the indiscriminate use of field operations to find
and capture those with qualifying convictions. 212 The use of immigration
detainers to funnel incarcerated noncitizens into the civil immigration
detention system was a longstanding practice, and it was codified in ICE
regulations.2 13 The criminal-to-civil transfers became far more prevalent
once the Secure Communities program installed an information database
in 2008 to identify incarcerated individuals who may also have violated
immigration laws. 2 14 Detention and removal rates skyrocketed. 2 15
Secure Communities relied on interrelated exercises of discretion. First,
information sharing across agencies enabled federal immigration officials in
ICE to screen the fingerprints of every individual arrested to check the
prints against immigration records. 2 16 Once ICE learned that local law
enforcement had a noncitizen in custody who was subject to removal,
immigration authorities could request that local authorities provide
advance notification of that noncitizen's scheduled release and detain, or
"hold," the person until immigration authorities could take custody. 217 The
second stage of coordination occurred when the local law enforcement
responded to ICE's request, either agreeing to hold the noncitizen for
transfer to ICE or releasing the person once the criminal sentence has been
2 10. Id.
211. Although the funding for interior enforcement is high, it is dwarfed by border
control and counter-terrorism. Interview with ICE official June 13, 2016).
212. Id.
213. See generally Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authoriy to Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 164, 165 (2008) (discussing histories of
immigration detainers); C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernandez, Naturalizing Immigration
Imprisonment, 103 CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1475-78 (2015) (describing detainers within the context
of federal-state crossover).
214. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1850 (2011)
(discussing local-federal partnerships and devolution of immigration enforcement).
215. Id. at 1851.
216. Secure Communities, U.S. CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/secure-comunities.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).
217. Id.
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served. 218 Over the course of the Secure Communities program's life, each
stage of decisionmaking between federal and local law enforcement
underwent a roller coaster of expansions and contractions.2 19 Eventually,
acknowledging a loss of public confidence and ongoing challenges to the
latest incarnation of the program, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson replaced it
with the Priorities Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2014.220 PEP put several
limits on federal immigration detainer requests. Rather than having states
hold immigrants for transfer to ICE, in most cases, ICE requested that jails
notify them of scheduled releases if there was probable cause to believe that
the immigrant is deportable 22 1 Criteria for triggering these notifications
tilted toward more serious crimes. 222 In short, PEP aimed to control agency
discretion in an effort to elicit local cooperation. 223
Ensuring consistent decisions across both stages of discretion involved
many obstacles. When President Obama took office in 2008, he inherited
an ICE that vigorously pursued its enforcement mission and whose
organizational culture was impervious to exercising discretion under any
circumstance. More than one ICE official relayed in interviews the
anecdote that ICE officers presented with a choice between deporting the
proverbial undocumented grandmother and the undocumented murderer
would go after both.224 Many critics complained that this zero tolerance
mindset created a chaotic, inconsistent, and unjust system of removal. 225
Changing the mindset in order to cure the organizational dysfunction was
not easy. 226 In response, ICE Director John Morton in 2010 issued a
memo listing criteria that shifted the benchmarks toward quality, not
218. Id.
219. Among the important changes was a FOIA lawsuit that resulted in ICE clarifying
that, at stage one, the detainer request was optional not mandatory. NDLON v. ICE, 827
F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The legal challenges to the use of immigration detainers,
the Constitutional safeguards, and a roller coaster of policymaking continues. Id.
220. See supra note 149.
221. Id.
2 2 2. Id.
223. See Written Testimony of ICE Director Sarah Saldana for a Senate Committee on the Judiciay
Hearing Titled "Oversight of the Administration's Criminal Alien Removal Policies," DHS (Dec. 2,
2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/12/02/written-testimony-ice-director-senate-
committee-judiciary-hearing-titled-"oversight, (noting that PEP was designed to be flexible
in favor of local authorities so as not to damage their trust and that "it is critically important
that we bring back non-compliant jurisdictions as partners.").
224. Interview with ICE official (June 13, 2016); interview with DHS official (June 10,
2016).
2 2 5. Id.
2 2 6. Id.
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quantity.227 Still, as an ICE official explained to me, many ICE officers did
not want discretion even once granted it, and many did not exercise it even
after the Morton memo ordered it.228 This made it difficult to implement
the new enforcement priorities.
DHS leadership chipped away at the zero tolerance enforcement
mindset by appealing to the hierarchical culture of ICE.229 Respect for the
chain of command meant that DHS headquarters called on ICE principals
to bring their inferior officers and employees in line. 23 0  Talk of
professionalization and modernization of ICE appealed to the ICE
principals, even if it took more effort to persuade line officers. 231 DHS
portrayed enforcement priorities as a "smart strategy" tantamount to the
special missions used by elite units in DHS and by DOJ prosecutors.23 2 Still
designing guidelines for discretion was not easy given the overbreadth of
statutory grounds for entering jail and then being flagged for
removability. 233 ICE Director Morton issued a second memo with more
detailed criteria in 2011.234 More priorities memos followed and a Task
Force was created to identify low-level crimes that should not be treated as
serious for purposes of removal. 235 Insiders recalled "countless efforts" to
alter agency practices, so many in fact that management became concerned
227. Morton memo, supra note 143;Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 144.
228. Interview with ICE official (Jun 13, 2016).
229. Interview with ICE official (June 13, 2016); interview with DHS official (July 5,
2016); interview with DHS official (June 23, 2016).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. One ICE official relayed that the computer databases had difficulty disaggregating
the crimes associated with priority triggers and, in particular, sorting federal re-entry crimes
from violent crimes. Interview with ICE official (June 13, 2016); interview with immigration
attorney (May 19, 2016).
234. See generally John Morton, Memorandum: Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens, ICE (June 17, 2011), https://www,ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
235. The Task Force reported that the program failed to target serious criminals and
resulted in removal for low level offenses, such as traffic stops, civil immigration, and
criminal reentry offenses. For example, driving without a license was tantamount to a status
crime until more states allowed driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants. Yet existing
criteria treated it as a serious misdemeanor for purpose of applying immigration
enforcement priorities. The task force successfully persuaded ICE to change its policy. See
DHS, HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept.2011), big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/
TaskForce.pdf.
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about "change fatigue." 236  Looking back, principals across DHS
acknowledge the gradual shift in ICE toward a culture of prioritized
discretion, describing the change as "going through a difficult transition"
and then "turning a corner" even if discretion could still be better
controlled.23 7
The decentralized decisionmaking of local law enforcement in response
to ICE requests posed a different set of challenges outside the agency. If
the procedural deficiency ICE aimed to cure by centralizing intra-agency
discretion was organizational dysfunction, the procedural deficiency ICE
aimed to cure by communicating those discretionary criteria to localities
was the lack of transparency. 238 From its inception, ICE has operated
Secure Communities in a secretive manner. This lack of transparency
eventually undermined the program and contributed to its rescission. 239
There was significant confusion about the program's terms for
participation-a congressional investigation and a FOIA lawsuit were
required to clarify that local cooperation with ICE hold requests was
voluntary.240  The obfuscation shrouded the program in community
mistrust. 241 DHS Secretary Napolitano attempted to ameliorate tension by
establishing a Task Force comprised of respected stakeholders to improve
local-federal relations.242 However, Secure Communities had become a
236. Interview with ICE official (June 13, 2016); interview with DHS official (June 13,
2016).
237. Interview with DHS official (June 13, 2016). See Motomura, The President's
Dilemma, supra note 171 (describing how the exercise of discretion was inconsistent at first
after the Morton Memos were issued, that field officers originally refused to attend training
sessions).
238. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement, supra note 13.
239. Some DHS officials contested the characterization of their operation as
"secretive," instead saying that it suffered from disorganization that led to a perception of
obfuscation. Interview with ICE officer (June 13, 2016).
240. See Letter from Janet Napolitano, DHS Sec'y, to Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int'l Law (Sept. 7,
2010) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (responding to ICE's
inconsistent responses to local efforts to "opt-out"); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. ICE,
827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing FOIA litigation resulting in
revelation that ICE knew program was not voluntary despite contrary claims); see also
Christopher Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 205-09 (2012) (discussing the
convoluted history of immigration detainers through a critical analysis of the government
documents, forms, and regulations used to sustain them.).
241. Interview with immigration attorney (June 5, 2016); interview with DHS official
(June 10, 2016); interview with DHS official (June 23, 2016).
242. See DHS ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS
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lightning rod for all the problems with immigration enforcement.
Although some meaningful changes resulted, the process did not dispel
mistrust between local law enforcement, ICE, and citizen and noncitizen
community members.
Additionally, legal uncertainty about the procedures used to hold
immigrants beyond their scheduled release without a new warrant led to
litigation in some counties. 243 In at least one lawsuit, the court questioned
the detainment practices used to effectuate civil detention and stated that
counties could be held legally liable for cooperating with ICE.244 Once it
became clear that counties could no longer shift responsibility to the
origination of the request with the federal government, the system of
federal-to-local transfers fell apart in some places. 245 Concerned about
county liability for warrantless holds in violation of due process, a wave of
counties withdrew their cooperation. 246 The federal government could not
order non-cooperating jurisdictions to comply given that their participation
was voluntary. 247 Nor could the federal government persuade counties to
cooperate, given the broken trust operating through a decentralized system
of discretion. Secretary Johnson cited the lawsuits and loss of legitimacy as
a reason for rescinding Secure Communities.248
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-
secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf.
243. In a series of lawsuits, counties argued that immigration detainers violated
constitutional prohibitions against seizure without the government furnishing independent
probable cause of removability and a warrant for arrest. Several courts ruled that counties
could be subject to jurisdictional liability for honoring ICE's detainer requests, once ICE
had clarified detainers were optional and not mandatory. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d
634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that a county could be civilly liable for unlawfully detaining
immigrant for ICE because it was not required to comply).
244. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at*9, *11, *12 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
245. See generally National Map of Local Entanglement, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE
CENTER, (Dec. 19, 2016) (providing a map of the counties and a description of their
policies), https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map.
246. Id.
247. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43457, STATE AND LOCAL "SANCTUARY" POLICIES LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 15 (2015) ("Nothing in the INA purports to require that
states and localities honor immigration detainers.").
248. See supra note 149 ("the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely
misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general
hostility toward the enforcement of our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and
local law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate
with the program, and many have issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting such
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Although PEP addressed some of the substantive and procedural
shortcomings and tried to rebuild community trust, lingering doubt plagued
the chances for reform. The unfortunate killing of an innocent bystander
by a noncitizen who had been released from jail in San Francisco-rather
than transferred to ICE for an outstanding warrant-exacerbated the
tension. 249 Congress initiated hearings into the propriety of San Francisco
and other sanctuary cities failing to cooperate with ICE, and they proposed
Kate's Law as a measure to punish the choice. 250 Congress's crackdown on
sanctuary cities accelerated in the presence of political division and
controversy over the scope and scale of immigration enforcement and as
the parameters of cooperation with ICE detainers continue to be
litigated.251
What lessons flow from this story of policy dissolution? Foremost, the
rise and fall of Secure Communities and its replacement by PEP is a story
about the difficulties of centralizing decisionmaking across fragmented
criminal-civil immigration structures and within the agency. The President,
through DHS, relied on vertical hierarchy to centralize ICE discretion and
later the agency culture around the issuance of detainers. But he could not
compel local decisionmaking the same way. Once DHS devolved
discretion over cooperation with detainers to local law enforcement in jails,
a choice DHS continued to defend post-PEP, recapturing that discretion
cooperation. A number of federal courts have rejected the authority of state and local law
enforcement agencies to detain immigrants pursuant to federal detainers issued under the
current Secure Communities program."), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/ 141120_memo-securecommunities.pdf
249. See Lee Romney et al., Fatal Shooting of S.F Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE,
Local Police, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-sf-
shooting-20150707-story.html (describing how the killing of Kathryn Steinle precipitated a
national debate about sanctuary cities).
250. Congress has introduced several spending bills, called Kate's Laws, to defund
localities who chose not to cooperate. See Cristina Marcos, GOP Pushes to Defund Sanctuary
Cities in Spending Bills, THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2016), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/274336-
gop-lawmakers-push-defunding-sanctuary-cities-in-spending-bills. (following the presidential
election of Donald Trump, Congress renewed its efforts to cut funding for sanctuary cities
based on 8 U.S.C. § 1373); cf Office of the Hon. John Culberson, Attorney General Lynch
Confirms New Sanctuary Cities Policy During Hearing with Chairman Culberson (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://culberson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=398414.
251. For a summary of the challenges to immigration detainers, see Chris Lasch, The
Faulty Arguments Behind Immigration Detainers, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY CENTER PERSPECTIVES SERIES 2, 5-8 (2013); Laurence Benenson, The Trouble with
Immigration Detainers, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (May 24, 2016), http: //immigration
forum.org/blog/the-trouble-with-immigration-detainers/.
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proved challenging.2 52 The resulting national enforcement strategy was
heavily contingent on a myriad of decentralized decisions. 253 The future of
PEP, which remains reliant on discretion and continues to fall short of the
President's priority of more targeted enforcement for "criminal aliens,"
remained uncertain at the close of the Obama administration and start of
the Trump administration. 254
3. Coordinating Response to Central American Asylum-Seekers at the Border
Control of the borders requires coordination within and across the vast
immigration bureaucracy of immigration authorities. Given the scale and
complexity of the task, it is prone to administrative obstacles. Congress's
mandate and budget for border control has traditionally been robust,
calling for strong enforcement and enabling vigorous efforts to control the
U.S.-Mexico southern border. 255 The heavy emphasis of immigration
policy on border control involves coordination among multiple units of
DHS and the DOJ, especially where asylum seekers are involved. 256
Depending on the circumstances of the immigrant, the State Department,
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) might also be involved. 257
Within DHS, Border Patrol must work with USCIS and ICE to balance
enforcement efforts with equitable exceptions for humanitarian concerns in
border control. This requires deft intra-agency coordination. Once initial
determinations about enforcement have been made, DHS's process for
pursuing removal of immigrants requires adjudication in immigration
252. See Juliet Stumpf, D(E) Volving Discretion: The Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1259 (2015). On the continuing need for some version of PEP; David
Martin, Resolute Enforcement, 30J.L. & POL. 411, 454-58 (2015) (explaining the effectiveness of
immigration detainers and the promise of shared governance in immigration enforcement).
253. Id.
254. The Trump Executive Order Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the
United States (Jan. 27, 2017) ends PEP and reinstates Secure Communities.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/presidential-executive-order-
enhancing-public-safety-interior-united.
255. See, e.g.,Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 144; Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017); DHS Secretary Kelley Implementation Memos for Trump
Executive Orders on Border Security (Feb. 21, 2017) and National Interest (Feb. 21, 2017).
256. USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States, https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
257. For example, Central American minors are privy to special processes involving
these agencies. USCIS, Central American Minors, https://www.uscis.gov/CAM (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017).
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courts operated by the DOJ within the EOIR-itself divided into a fact-
finding body, review board, and litigating body. 258  As a whole,
coordinating the many institutional actors throughout the stages of
immigrant apprehension, processing, and removal is daunting. The case
study of border control that follows is a story of a fragmented agency
struggling to manage an unanticipated crisis in a highly sensitive area,
without a clear operational plan for navigating a complex bureaucracy. It
is also a story about the deleterious effects of that failure for the agencies,
immigrants, and presidential policy.
After several years of leveling border apprehensions from Mexico,
Central American migration into the United States rose in 2014 and in
2016.259 This surge, motivated by migrants fleeing violence in their home
countries and raising claims of political asylum, posed a crisis of
bureaucratic, political, and humanitarian dimensions. The treatment of
this migration as a crisis overwhelmed the capacity of the bureaucracy to
respond in a measured way. 260
Within DHS, stopping a border surge required clearing several
bureaucratic hurdles. The Border Patrol, which is part of a single agency
that combined Customs and Border Patrol during the creation of DHS,
served as the front line in border apprehensions. 26 1 In the course of the
initial investigation of unlawful entry, a Border Patrol officer would ask if
the migrant feared returning to his home country. 262 If so, a USCIS officer
would then conduct an interview to determine whether the person had a
credible fear of persecution if returned. 263 If not, ICE would transfer the
migrant to a detention center while waiting for expedited proceedings in
immigration court.264 If a USCIS officer determined the individual did
possess a credible fear of returning to his home country, ICE would release
the migrant to the community with a Notice to Appear in immigration
258. The EOIR website provides a self-help guide describing this process, available
here https://www.justice.gov/eoir/self-help-materials (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
259. SeeJosh Siegel, Central Americans Are Crossing the Border Illegally at 2014 'Crisis' Levels,
DAILYSIGNAL (May 5, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/05/central-americans-are-
crossing-the-border-illegally-at-2014-crisis-levels/.
260. See generallyJaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L.J. (2017).
261. A migrant who makes it past border checkpoints without inspection may be
apprehended by ICE and enter the defensive asylum adjudication process. USCIS, Obtaining
Asylum in the United States, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/
obtaining-asylum-united-states (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
262. Id.
2 6 3. Id.
264. Id.
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court for further proceedings in immigration court.265 If the migrant was
an unaccompanied child, the Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in
HHS would then take custody. 266 The immigration court that adjudicates
removal and considers appeals is housed at DOJ, within the EOIR.267 The
court reports to the Attorney General rather than the DHS Secretary.268
Every stage requires coordination to hue to the President's priorities.
The structural barriers in the immigration bureaucracy are visually
represented on a flow chart of the many entities involved. 269  The
separations between components on the chart are physical as well. Whereas
DHS leadership meets in a single headquarters office on Nebraska Avenue,
the component offices CBP, ICE, and USCIS are scattered throughout the
D.C. metro area. There is regular chatter of consolidating the physical
spaces to facilitate communication, but there is little progress toward the
endeavor. 270 Of course, it is not uncommon for complex organizations to
contain silos-indeed, separations between politically-appointed staff and
career staff provide a deliberate check on executive policymaking-but the
degree and direction of divisions in DHS and DOJ are notable. Beyond
the political versus career staff distinction, there are deep fissures between
the "front office" (a mix of political appointees and career staff whom
report to the DHS Secretary) and the "components."2 7' The field offices
historically have operated with significant independence from
headquarters.272 Long-time officials recalled disastrous incidents where
field offices interfaced directly with the State Department and foreign
entities in a manner that departed from top-down national priorities.273
Departmental efforts to coordinate enforcement between headquarters and
field offices are necessary and difficult given the history of antagonism.
Coordination across components are also necessary and difficult given that
2 6 5. Id.
266. See The US. Refugee Resettlement Program-An Overview, HHS, OFFICE OF REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT, http: / /www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/the-us-refugee-resettle
ment-program-an-overview (last visited on Feb. 21, 2017).
267. U.S. DOJ EOIR Organization Chart, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
organization-chart (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
268. Id.
269. CRS Insights: Unaccompanied Alien Children: A Processing Flow Chart (July
2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10107.pdf.
270. Interview with DHS General Counsel official (Nov. 4, 2016).
2 7 1. Id.
2 7 2. Id.
273. Interview with former INS official (July 5, 2016).
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the components were historically separate organizations prior to being
consolidated into DHS.274
The different personnel, missions, and cultures within each agency
further complicated the task of processing those apprehended at the
border.27 5 Border Patrol and ICE primarily focused on enforcement and
expulsion of migrants, USCIS and ORR primarily focused on providing
immigrant services and protecting asylum-seekers. 276  Whereas Border
Patrol was known for its toughness-it was charged with flagging for
further screening migrants seeking asylum with a fear of return. 277 As with
the structural barriers, these cultural barriers are palpable. Agency officials
strongly identified with their components, and they described the selection
of agency leaders to be a process driven by insiders with a "history" so as to
reinforce the separate identity of the component agency. 278  Intra-
departmental coordination across these cultures is hard. The hard
separation of DHS and DOJ following the 2002 reorganization of the
immigration bureaucracy intended to increase fairness by separating the
functions of enforcement and adjudication into different agencies.
However, the downside was that the separate agencies now needed to
coordinate on immigration and enforcement across cases and sometimes
within a single case.279 When the departments need to coordinate, their
interagency interactions are consequently sporadic and ad hoc rather than
systemized. 280
274. For more context and an analogous call for greater coordination among
immigration agencies, see Mark Noferi, Concentric Coordination, 42 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS
13-15 (Winter 2017).
275. Interview with DHS official (June 10, 2016); interview with immigration attorney
(July 18, 2016).
276. The USCIS Frequently Asked Questions about Credible Fear is available here:
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-credible-
fear-screening. The parallel site for asylum-seeking children is the ORR, which is available
here https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-states-unaccomp
anied-section-5.
277. Several DHS insiders described Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents as
"cowboys," "paramilitary," and "intolerant of leniency" under any circumstances.
Interviews with DHS and USCIS officials (May 31, 2016;June 10, 2016).
278. Interviews with DHS official (May 3, 2016; May 31, 2016;June 10, 2016).
279. Shah, supra note 113, at 814-15 (initial determinations in asylum cases were
transferred from DOJ's INS to DHS, although subsequent hearings and appeals are in
DOJ's EOIR). Notice that this flow reverses the usual course of immigration cases
beginning with initiation of action in DHS and then receiving initial determinations in the
immigration courts of the DOJ.
280. Id.
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An episode recalled by government insiders vividly illustrates the
problems resulting from the lack of intra-agency coordination. In 2014,
President Obama's DHS opened family detention centers to hold migrants
and to deter future crossings. 28 ' Reports surfaced of Border Patrol holding
units and ICE detention facilities being unfit for the care of children and
families. 282 ICE agents fumbled to change diapers and mix formula.283
The Obama administration desperately sought medical care and struggled
to obtain licenses for childcare and schooling of migrant children detained
while waiting for proceedings. 284 A DHS insider accounts that even
figuring out who should pay for showers in the temporary border facilities
proved perplexing. 285  The use of family detention became a public
relations disaster and created the impression of a situation out of control. 286
Arresting and holding children and families, particularly those fleeing chaos
and violence in Central America, seemed incongruous with President
Obama's promise to focus on "[flelons, not families" during prior
announcements. 287 Independent revelations of Border Patrol's excessive
use of force and subpar holding cells, plus a federal court order denying
ICE family detention facilities child care licenses, exacerbated the crisis.288
281. See Seung Min Kim, House Dems Urge Obama to End Immigrant Family Detention,
PoLITIco (May 27, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/immigrant-family-
detention-house-democrats-obama-118317 (DHS spokesperson Marsha Catron is quoted
saying that family detention is a safe, "effective and humane" way to maintain family unity).
282. Jorge Rivas, These Unsealed Photos Offer Rare Peak Inside Border Patrol's Notorious 'Ice
Box'Detention Cells, FUSIoN (June 29, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/319856/judge-border-
patrol-unseal-pictures-documents/ (describing a recently-initiated lawsuit challenging
conditions of CBP holding cells dubbed "ice boxes").
283. Border Patrol Changing Diapers, Heating Baby Formula for Surge of Children, WASH. TIMES
(June 13, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/13/border-patrol-
change-diapers-heat-baby-formula/.
284. A Texas court subsequently issued an order denying childcare licenses in family
detention, leading to release of hundreds of detained immigrants in Texas. Grassroots
Leadership, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Family & Protec. Serv., No. D-1-GN-15-004336 1, 7-8
(Travis City Civ. Dist. Ct. 2016).
285. Interview with DHS official (June 10, 2016).
286. See Stop Detaining Families, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER,
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/stop-detaining-families (July 26, 2016) (detailing the
negative impact family detention has on mothers and children).
287. See Wil S. Hylton, The Shame ofAmerica's Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-
detention-camps.html?_r=0 (describing the disconnect between President Obama's
compassionate announcements regarding protecting immigrant families and the reality of
the horrible conditions they face in detention).
288. See CBP Use of Force Review: Cases and Policies, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH
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DHS Secretary Johnson attempted to take control of the crisis by
pursuing a proactive strategy of deterrence. Standing in front of the family
detention center in Dilley, Texas shortly after issuing his 2014 memo
categorizing recent migrants as a category one priority, Secretary Johnson
said, "we want to send a message that our border is not open to illegal
migration, and if you come here, you should not expect to simply be
released. . . . I believe this is an effective deterrent."28 9 These statements
conveyed that enforcement actions against recent migrants were
hierarchical orders "coming from the top." 290 Yet the public statements
could not overcome the challenges of moving DHS's complex machinery to
respond to a genuine crisis.291
A second episode in the migration crisis highlights the need for
interagency coordination and the dangers of the DOJ and DHS working in
isolation when developing an effective response to crisis. After the border
surge briefly calmed, Central American migration once again surged in
2015.292 This time, in Operation Border Guardian, DHS shifted its
FORUM (Feb. 2013), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PERFReport.pdf
(concluding that Border Patrol agents were often using unjustified excessive force); Rivas,
supra note 282 (showing photos obtained in ACLU litigation); see also Grassroots Leadership, No.
D-1-GN-15-004336 at 7-8.
289. See Press Release, DHS, Statement byJehJohnson on Southwest Border Scrutiny,
(Mar. 9, 2016); see also Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-
security-chief-opens-largest-immigration-detention-center-in-us.html. The November 2014
DHS enforcement priorities memo contained stark language categorizing recent migration
as a category one priority for removals, on par with national security risks or danger to the
community. See November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 220. Secretary
Johnson rationalized the seemingly harsh treatment as necessary to promote the safety of the
migrants and the integrity of the border. Id.
290. Numerous interviews described Operation Border Guardian and its policy of
deterrence as coming from the top. See e.g. interview with immigration attorney (May 30,
2016;June 6, 2016); Interview with DHS official (June 10, 2016).
291. Family detention additionally exposed the administration to congressional
hearings and litigation over possible violations of international and U.S. law, including a
prior settlement with the federal government. See Flores v. Johnson, CV 85-4544 DMG,
2015 WL 13049844, at *2, *17 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015), rehearing denied, Flores v. Lynch,
No. CV-85-04544 DMG, 2015 WL 9915880 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015). Federal judge
Dolly Gee entered a court order declaring the DHS "no-release policy" for children awaiting
determinations of their eligibility to remain in the U.S. violated the terms of an earlier
settlement. The District Court order applied the settlement terms to minors and
accompanying adults. A DHS advisory committee subsequently recommended ending
family detention.
292. Siegel, supra note 259.
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enforcement strategy from deterring through the use of family detention
toward priority docketing.293 DHS accomplished this by identifying the
claims of recently arrived migrants for prompt EOIR adjudication, in the
hopes that priority docketing would permit a fast track for the removal of
immigrants determined to be ineligible for asylum. 294 In theory, the
priority dockets ameliorated the need for prolonged family detention.
Prioritizing the claims of recent migrants in immigration court lessened the
time until an initial master calendar hearing to twenty-one days compared
to a preexisting system that could involve long delays for even the initial
hearings.295  The recent migrants faced court and could theoretically
receive a determination on their asylum claim within weeks. 296 However,
their actual removal times varied in the face of ongoing backlogs for later
stages of removal and there was little evidence that lessening backlogs
deterred future crossings.2 97
Insiders and outsiders to Operation Border Guardian said that it "came
from the top."298 Some meant that the policy came from the White House
without agency consultation. Others meant that it came from their
politically-appointed agency leadership. For the DOJ, this meant the
Attorney General's memorandum to the immigration courts. For DHS,
this meant Secretary Johnson's directives to the components. Nobody
reported collaboration between the DOJ and DHS. Though it is difficult to
corroborate second-hand reports of high-level conversations, the shared
belief is that the policy was imposed swiftly and that the White House
approached operations in both agencies in an ad hoc manner that
contributed to its subsequent challenges.
293. Some immigration attorneys postulate that the shift in strategy is also prompted by
Judge Dolly Gee's order enforcing the Flores settlement, though ICE disputes this contention.
Interview with immigration attorney (June 6, 2016).
294. Liz Robbins, Immgration Cnsis Shifis From Border to Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/nyregion/border-crisis-shifts-as-undocu
mented-childrens-cases-overwhelm-courts.html.
295. Id.
296. The ACLU, American Immigration Lawyers' Association, and other advocacy
groups have filed charges that immigrants have insufficient opportunity to obtain legal
counsel and exhaust their legal remedies before being ordered removed. See, e.g., R.I.L.-
R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015); Castro v. DHS, 163 F. Supp. 3d 157
(E.D. Pa. 2016).
297. See, e.g., R.IL.-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164; Castro, 163 F. Supp. 3d 157.
298. Interview with immigration attorney (May 30, 2016; June 6, 2016); Interview with
DHS official (June 10, 2016).
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Agency insiders recounted that the problems with priority docketing
were partly substantial and partly procedural.299 DHS and EOIR desired a
more efficient and effective process of adjudication. The concerns for
massive backlog and long delay were linked to the policy of deterrence
insofar as some officials believed a reputation for processing delay was itself
a pull factor for migration.30 0 Against these operational goals, the results
were mixed. In some cases, priority docketing led to faster removals. 301
However, while DHS's prioritization of EOIR docketing led to faster
scheduling of master calendar hearings, in some cases EOIR granted
multiple continuances that nevertheless led to delay.30 2 These delays were
exacerbated by the backlog of cases that accumulated, even after an
infusion of resources to hire more immigration judges and to improve
staffing in immigration courts. In other cases, rapid processing led to
subsequent appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts
that delayed the eventual removal of immigrants.303  Again, the
accumulation of these cases at higher levels of review clogged the removal
process. In total, the experiment with rapid processing through the priority
dockets taxed the already overwhelmed immigration courts (staffed by DOJ
and EOIR's immigration judges) and the ICE attorneys who prosecuted
the claims on behalf of DHS.304 ORR, housed within HHS, has special
responsibilities toward immigrant children and also strained to keep up.305
299. Interview with DHS official (Nov. 4, 2016); Interview with U.S. DOJ EOIR
official (Nov. 9, 2016).
300. Interview with former INS official (July 5, 2016). Doris Meissner, Upfront Hearings
a Must to Stem the Tide of Border-Crossing Children, DALLAS NEWS (June 2014),
http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2014/06/22/upfront-hearings-a-must-
to-stem-tide-of-border-crossing-children (noting the theory of delay as a pull factor)
(Meissner is a former INS Commissioner, now at Migration Policy Institute).
301. See generally Emily R. Summers, Prioritizing Failure: Using the "Rocket Docket"
Phenomenon to Describe Adult Detention, 102 IOWA L. REV. 851, 851 (2017).
302. Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates in Overworked Immigration Courts,
TRACIMMIGRATION (Sept. 21, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/405/.
303. See generally Reducing the Immigration Court Backlog and Delays, HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST 2
(July 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Backgrounder-
Immigration-Courts.pdf.
304. See TRAC, Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates in Overworked Immigration Courts,
TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT (Sept. 21, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/405/; Susan Carroll & David McCumber, Flow of Border Immigrants Overwhelming
Agencies, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (June 1, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
houston-texas/houston/article/Flow-of-border-immigrants-overwhelming-agencies-552003
7.php.
305. Because unaccompanied children are considered especially vulnerable, DHS is
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The fragmentation of the immigration deportation system across the
executive branch undermined itself in the pursuit of President Obama's
priority of pursuing recently-arrived migrants.
Agency officials, especially in the "offices of goodness" that hear
complaints about agency processes and asylum officers involved in credible
fear determinations, emphasized that the operational goal of efficiency was
counterbalanced with the goal of abiding by fair procedures and
humanitarian obligations.30 6  Against this goal, some would say the
operation was successful and point to the high numbers of removals and
apprehensions.3 07  Others point to similar numbers and say the high
numbers meant the heightened enforcement was not deterring future
crossings.308 Setting aside debates over the causes of migration and rates of
apprehension, other immigration advocates felt the process used to detain
and deport lacked procedural legitimacy.309 Under the priority docket,
immigrants often stood for court without an opportunity to consult with
counsel or consider their options to appeal.310 Once an immigration judge
supposed to turn the children over to the ORR after processing. Typically, ORR houses
children in state-licensed shelters or facilities while their cases are pending. ACF About
Unaccompanied Children's Services, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/ucs/about (last
visitedJan.17, 2017).
306. See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies,
36 CARDoZO L. REV. 53, 55-65 (2014); see also Interview with DHS official (6/10/2016).
307. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson points to March 2016 CBP statistics showing that
Operation Border Guardian resulted in repatriation of 28,000 individuals to Central
America and 128,000 to Mexico and highlights recent raids to send a message to potential
migrants that they will be sent home and should not cross illegally. See Statement by Jeh
Johnson, supra note 289.
308. Those finding fault with the narrative of immigration control point out that
refugees fleeing home country violence will not be deterred by heightened U.S. immigration
enforcement. An article reporting on the same CBP data makes the point that the numbers
of families fleeing Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to enter the U.S. illegally have
increased and features families saying that detentions, raids, and other policy disincentives
would not affect their resolve to try to migrate when they felt they had no other options. See
Meredith Hoffman, Deportation Raids Aren't Deterring Central American Families from Coming to the
US., VICE NEWS (May 19, 2016) (quoting an asylum-seeker who was unaware of family
detention before migrating and said "it was a surprise to spend time in detention, but at least
no one was threatening to kill us there"). The article draws parallels to a political science
report showing that even individuals who were aware of such penalties were undiscouraged
from coming if their migration was motivated by home country violence. See Jonathan
Hiskey, et al., Violence and Migration in Central America, INSIGHTS (2014).
309. Interview with DHS official (June 10, 2016; Nov. 4, 2016).
310. David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah, Time, Due Process, and Representation: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823,
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determined that the migrant was not eligible to remain and entered a
removal order, deportation was swift. ICE aggressively sought and
deported these recent migrants.3 11 Multiple lawsuits challenging the
priority dockets were filed claiming that the expedited procedures deny the
immigrant a chance to obtain counsel and to prepare their case for a full
and fair hearing before an immigration judge.3 12 The claims of Due
Process violations used in the course of obtaining those removals and
skepticism about the regularity of adjudicatory processes leading to the
deportations or their fidelity to humanitarian obligations owed to refugees
threaten the legitimacy of the enforcement operation.
In sum, Operation Border Guardian pulled apart the federal
government in its quest to adjudicate and deport recently-arrived
immigrants efficiently, while also respecting humanitarian obligations to
protect immigrants eligible for asylum-based relief from removal from the
harms of persecution upon return to their persecutors. On the substantive
goal of strong enforcement, the crisis created an opportunity for DHS to
flex muscles on immigration enforcement and to communicate a
commitment to Congress that it was serious about securing the border.
Congress had long set detention and deportation quotas for DHS,313 and
some government insiders claimed that the raids were specifically fueled by
the agency's need to meet numerical quotas once lowered priority for long-
time undocumented residents drove down apprehension numbers.314
Others felt the raids were conceived to demonstrate DHS's faithfulness to
its statutory charge, particularly given that Republicans in Congress
increased funding for this express purpose and called for even more border
1825 (2016).
311. Id. at 1824.
312. E.g., J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016); Castro v. DHS, 835 F.3d
422 (3d Cir. 2016).
313. See Ted Robbins, Little Known Immigration Mandate Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR:
MORNING EDITION (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601 /little-
known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full; see also Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew
Becker, ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POsT (March 27, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032604891.html?sid=ST2010032700037.
314. Interview with immigration attorney (May 30, 2016). See Aggressive Immagration
Enforcement Quotas Also Used to Detain Mothers and their Children, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS (June 17, 2016), http://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/new-
report-aggressive-immigration-enforcement-quotas-also-used; Lauren Gambino, Huge Family
Detention Centre to Open in Texas for Undocumented Migrants, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/family-detention-centre-texas-
undocumented-migrants.
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security.315  Those hoping for Congress to enact comprehensive
immigration reform maintained that strong enforcement against those who
had not yet developed ties and equities in the United States preserved the
viability of relief for long-term residents.3 16 Showing seriousness about
enforcement served as a bargaining chip for legislation involving
legalization-what one insider called "enforcing your way toward
comprehensive immigration reform." 317
However, the poorly-coordinated response strained the executive
branch's institutional capacity, failed to deter future migration, and
compromised the agency's humanitarian responsibilities toward a
migration crisis. 3 1 8 The significant coordination challenges inherent in
developing a response to a complex problem was undoubtedly exacerbated
by enduring structural problems in the DHS and the unanticipated
outbreak of a migration crisis. The resulting policy subordinated internal
administrative needs to external policy demands. It did not allow for a
reconciliation of organizational, humanitarian, and legal objections
inherent within DHS's conflicting agency mission. And ultimately, the
procedural failures undermined its substantive goals of efficient and well-
functioning agency adjudication that could eliminate a putative pull factor
for unlawful border crossings.
The three examples from the immigration context illustrate a typology of
strategies to manage agency implementation of presidential policy. While
multiple types of intervention were present in each case study, one served as
a defining feature for each case: promoting a coherent system of
enforcement priorities in deferred action, ensuring consistent decisions over
the issuance of immigration detainers for detention of "criminal aliens,"
and coordinating interagency actions for removal of Central American
315. Interview with DHS official (June 5, 2016); interview with DHS official (June 10,
2016). Congress's support for the border crackdown was divided. Democrats criticized
President Obama for his unpopular policy and instead favored legislation to help Central
American governments deal with root causes of the mass migration. See Rafael Bernal, Dems
Guard Against Migrant Surge, The HILL (July 3, 2016), http://thehill.com/latino/286342-dems-
guard-against-migrant-surge (describing a bill presented by Senate Democrats that would
focus on helping Central American government deal with root causes of migration to the
United States).
316. Interview with immigration attorney (June 6, 2016; June 30, 2016;July 18, 2016).
317. Interview with DHS official (June 10, 2016). For discussion of the Enforcement
First Strategy, see The Fallacy of "Enforcement First": Immigration Enforcement Without Immigration
Reform has been Failing for Decades, AM. IMMIGR. COUNs. (May 9, 2013),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/fallacy-enforcement-first.
318. Supra notes 250-291; 298-305.
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asylum-seekers.3 19 However, the reception of the agency and their
willingness to cooperate with the President's priorities differed.3 20
In the case study of deferred action, President Obama somewhat
succeeded in promoting a coherent system of enforcement priorities amid
the reality of insufficient resources and conflicting directives. 321 However,
he and his appointed leadership struggled to transform the culture in DHS
to align with the new priorities.32 2 Then USCIS relied on policymaking
tools, such as agency guidance, that were vulnerable to legal and political
challenge in the decision not to engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking.323 These procedural deficiencies created a shaky foundation
for DACA and toppled DAPA in the face of legal challenge and moral
dissent. 324
Both the President's policy of detaining "criminal aliens" and fast
tracking removal for recently-arrived Central American immigrants showed
the President's inability to integrate his policies with the operational needs
of a complicated bureaucracy. The DHS's policies governing the use of
detainers to transfer immigrants with criminal histories into civil detention
was an effective policy for boosting enforcement metrics imposed by
Congress and an improvement over decentralized decisionmaking at the
local level. 325  However, it swept too broadly within the category of
"criminal aliens" and lost legitimacy following a series of procedural
missteps from which it never recovered.326 Some of this cost could have
been avoided. ICE could have fine-tuned operations to avoid overbreadth
in the issuance of detainers and could have been more transparent about
modifications to preexisting regulations on detainers by joining the use of
biometric data to the practice of issuing detainer requests. ICE could have
invited participation from those outside the agency when creating protocols
for local law enforcement to respond to those detainer requests, instead of
waiting on protracted FOIA litigation and congressional hearings before
disclosing the voluntary nature of the requests. Centralizing decisions to
319. Supra Part II.B.
320. Id.
321. See Cox & Rodriguez, Redux 2, supra note 61, at 178-79; see also supra notes 155-
156.
322. Supra notes 164-185
323. Supra notes 199-202.
324. As this Article goes to press, the vitality of the DACA and DAPA program in a
new administration with differing policy goals and continuing political division is uncertain.
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Unauthorized Immigrants Covered by DACA Face Uncertain Future, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 5, 2017).
325. Supra notes 211-215.
326. Supra Part notes 220, 239-242.
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cooperate within a decentralized implementation structure requires the
President and political leadership to be even more persuasive with those not
bound to follow, as a practical matter, if seeking effective agency operation.
Curing these pragmatic and procedural defects for the sake of efficacy
would not salvage the programs if they proved unconstitutional on other
grounds, of course. Procedural legitimacy operates above the threshold of
due process to improve processes presumed legal. The President and his
agencies must do at least as much as due process requires and may benefit
from doing more to restore trust in the immigration system. 327
The DHS's uncoordinated intra- and interagency response to the border
surge revealed problems within and across the immigration bureaucracy.
Despite ICE's and CBP's aggressive efforts to align agency enforcement
procedures with the President's prioritization of recently-arrived
immigrants, the dysfunction within DHS and the fragmentation of the
DHS with DOJ immigration courts failed to produce the mass-scale
deportations the Obama administration undertook.32 8 They also failed to
deter migrants seeking asylum from coming to the United States, even
allowing for exogenous causes for this migration such as civil unrest and
violence within Central America. 329 The sloppy response raised the furor
of critics and supporters of tighter border control due to concerns about the
due process rights of the recently-arrived immigrants denied access to
counsel, adequate detention conditions, and fair and efficient
adjudication.3 30  The agency needed leadership at a higher level to
overcome these coordination challenges and needed systematic, rather than
sporadic, mechanisms to be effective. 33 '
327. As this Article goes to press, there is growing concern in courts that aspects of
federal detainer practice and laws seeking to curb funding for localities that choose not to
comply with federal requests for cooperation in law enforcement violate the Constitution.
H.B.C., States and Cities Use Litigation To Fight Donald Tmmp's Immigration Orders, The
Economist (Feb. 2, 2017). While the substantive merits of these claims is not the primary
focus of this Article, perception that agency practices violate due process or other
Constitutional commands endanger procedural legitimacy. Chen, Trust in Immigration
Enforcement, supra note 13.
328. Supra notes 281-303.
329. Supra notes 306-307.
330. Supra notes 308-311.
331. As this Article goes to press, these concerns about constitutional due process
violations in asylum adjudication are gaining ground in courts. Supra notes 296, 312. While
the merits of the legal claims are not the primary focus of this Article, findings that agency
practices violate due process pose a mandatory threshold beneath the prudential procedures
for the president and his agencies that are the focus of this Article.
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III. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR-IN-CHIEF
This Article began by calling for greater attention to, and acceptance of,
the President's role as Administrator-in-Chief: improving the
administration of law through fair procedures and good governance that
can boost the legitimacy of executive policy. Fulfilling this role involves
supporting agencies by promoting coherent policy amid administrative
realities, centralizing discretion to produce consistent decisions within
agencies, and coordinating agency action across the executive branch. Part
II described the Obama administration's attempt to effectuate this
administrative approach in the context of three case studies related to
immigration: coherent enforcement priorities for DACA and DAPA,
centralized discretion over immigrant detention for "criminal aliens," and
coordinated deportation for recently-arrived Central American immigrants.
The evaluation of each is mixed, with the procedural deficiencies
undermining and sometimes undoing programs on grounds of legitimacy.
This Part suggests prudential ways to enhance the legitimacy of executive
agencies by improving procedures and reforming procedural deficiencies
that make them vulnerable in the face of contention.
To a great and rising extent, presidential success requires the Chief
Executive to partner with regulatory agencies to perform the work of
government. There is too much to do, and so much expertise is required to
do it. The ability of a president to influence his agencies is critical for the
sake of good governance, agency expertise, and deliberation. 332 The worry,
of course, is that the President will too forcefully control agencies or
embroil the agencies themselves in political fights, in violation of legal and
professional norms. 333 To be sure, executive power cannot operate without
constraint. Understanding the levels of presidential influence and the
external effects they may have on policymakers and the public improves
our ability to strike a balance that values public administration as a source
and solution.
The remainder of this section proposes a new approach toward
presidential involvement in administrative action that emphasizes more
executive oversight with increased agency collaboration on operations. This
approach. builds on the normative evaluation that executive action is on its
firmest ground when the President is acting as the Administrator-in-Chief,
supervising and supporting agency operations, rather than merely a
policymaker seeking to assert substantive policy without following proper
332. Shapiro et al., supra note 34, at 486-91 (2012) (endorsing inside-out values of
expertise and deliberation over outside-in values as source of agency legitimation).
333. Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 443,44-44 (1987).
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procedure and without enlisting the cooperation of government officials in
the administrative state, states and localities, or private individuals. It offers
concrete steps that can be taken to improve the quality of administrative
processes and to guard against abuses of agency discretion. Improving the
quality of administrative procedures has the salutary benefit of boosting the
policies' perceived legitimacy and thereby raising acceptance of them in the
face of ongoing controversy.3 34 While this is not a one-size-fits-all solution,
the suggestions can positively impact regulatory policymaking within and
beyond the sphere of immigration law.
A. Toward a Framework for the Administrator-in-Chief
Shifting to a framework that values the President's role in the internal
administration of agencies, and away from the traditional assumption that
presidential influence necessarily embroils agencies in substantive
policymaking of a questionable nature, requires a significant reworking of
existing parameters for presidential administration. This section prescribes
steps to improve executive oversight, disclosure of agency procedures, and
fidelity to professional norms.
1. Presciptions for Promoting Coherence
The President possesses a national perspective that justifies his oversight
over executive agencies. One of the most important aspects of his role as
Administrator-in-Chief is to impart a coherent policy to agencies.335 Some
justify the President's leadership on agency policy as the product of a
political mandate for which he will ultimately be held accountable.33 6
Perhaps. Presidential addresses from the Rose Garden can be potent
symbols. They lend political accountability and moral legitimacy to agency
actions. My point is slightly different. The President can boost the clarity
and transparency of his policy agenda, and those of his agencies, in these
moments for the sake of enhancing operational expertise.
There are several ways to encourage expertise. First, the President can
334. For more research on the links between procedural legitimacy and acceptance of
outcomes, see TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 12; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
COOPERATE supra note 12. A rich empirical literature has followed, including some studies
in the immigration context. See Chen, Trust In Immigration Enforcement, supra note 13; Emily
Ryo, Deciding to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM. Soc. REV. 574
(2013); Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance, Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62
UCLA L. REv. 622 (2015).
335. Supra Part I.B.1, Part II.B.1; infia Part III.B.1.
336. Id. See generally Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 15, at 2281-99 (2001).
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engage the resources of the Executive Office of the President's Domestic
Policy Council and OIRA's regulatory planning process when approaching
the agencies that will carry out this policy agenda. 337 These White House
offices add to the political mandate a unifying vision and administrative
competence that can improve the agency's effectiveness. 338 Whereas the
President offers to agencies moral authority, the White House offices and
OIRA offer expertise in the process of policymaking.3 39 The shared effort
permits agencies to focus on cultivating the substantive expertise and
operational savvy to translate policy agendas into a workable plan. Second,
the President can choose to be less engaged and more deferential to agency
experience on operational details. Either way, the key point is for the
President to maintain discipline in his policymaking by encouraging
operational expertise in the course of policy implementation.
The deferred action case studies demonstrate a strong supervisory
orientation to executive oversight aimed at promoting a coherent
immigration policy.3 4o President Obama through the Domestic Policy
337. Executive oversight is currently channeled through OIRA's regulatory planning
and centralized regulatory review processes, pursuant to Executive Order 12866. E.O.
12866 contains a review and a planning process. Exec. Order No. 12,866 Section 4
(planning mechanism); Section 6 (centralized regulatory review). Most scholarship on
executive oversight focuses on the cost-benefit analysis within regulatory review. Because
regulatory planning most directly contributes to the crystallization of coherent policy, this
Article suggests the planning function should be exercised more broadly and more
rigorously. At present, the Regulatory Plan agencies submit identifies regulatory priorities
and contains additional detail about the most important significant regulatory actions that
agencies expect to take in the coming year." OIRA, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
"Current Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,"
(2016), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain. This can be applied to both
rulemaking and to the fashioning of policies that undergird agency adjudication, such as
priority docketing. For a similar suggestion, see Shah, supra note 113, at 814 (2015).
338. See Sunstein, supra note at 68, at 1849; Harold Bruff, Presidential Management of
Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 557 (1988-89) (discussing the goals of review
in OIRA "based upon a recognition that, like any other outside review, executive oversight
can make regulation more reasoned. . ."); Domestic Policy Council, A Strong American & A
Strong Middle Class, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/dpc.
339. See text accompanying supra notes 42-45.
340. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1. The irony is that DACA aimed to curb low-level
discretion by channeling decision-making to higher-level enforcement priorities that were
themselves premised on discretion. The Texas v. United States litigation about the categorical
nature of discretionary relief captured this irony. See supra Part II.B. 1; United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2771 (2016) (No. 15-674). A similar irony pertains to the priorities contained in
the Morton memo and the Johnson memo rescinding Secure Communities and replacing it
with the PEP program. Supra Part II.B.2; Morton memo 2011, supra note 143; Johnson
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Council sought to involve the DHS Secretary in the preparation of the
memos in 2012 and 2014.341 The White House and DHS engaged in
intensive consultation to set forth criteria for exercising enforcement
discretion and to develop procedures to see that the presidential priorities
would be followed by the agency staff.342 This type of agenda-setting and
operational intervention is necessary to craft policy that works.
Thus, the deferred action policies approximated many of the good
guidance values even without notice-and-comment procedures. However,
in the spirit of promoting the substantive value of coherence and the
procedural value of transparency, USCIS should have more clearly
explained why it was undertaking these policies and why it was not
undergoing rulemaking. The agency could have strengthened its guidance
on deferred action by explaining managerial concerns, such as the need to
allocate scarce resources, to ensure consistency in case processing, and to
align case-processing criteria with presidential priorities. Or the agency
could have gone a step farther by enacting its policies through notice-and-
comment rulemaking that would have met these goals and additionally
broadened the reach of consultation and routinized the channels of
participation. While engaging in notice-and-comment would have taken
longer, the case studies demonstrate that more procedure could have
protected the programs from internal and external challenge that
themselves delayed implementation of the programs.
To an even greater extent, the President and his principals in the DHS
and DOJ would have benefitted from formulating a more coherent plan for
their prioritization of recently-arrived migrants from Central America. 343
Hasty resort to family detention and priority docketing in immigration
courts failed to articulate a coherent vision for enforcement that balanced
the goals of deterring unauthorized migration with humanitarian
protections for asylum seekers. The resulting disarray at the border and
within the detention centers and courtrooms involved in responding to a
migration crisis compromised the success of enforcement outcomes and the
perceived legitimacy of the program, which is hamstrung by public outcry
and legal challenge.
Priorities Memo, supra note 144. Cox and Rodriguez describe this feature of the Obama
Administration's immigration policies as institutionalizing enforcement discretion. See Cox
& Rodriguez, Redux 2, supra note 61, at 187-89.
341. See Palmer et al., supra note 184.
342. See id.
343. Supra Part II.B.3.
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2. Prescrtions for Centralizing Discretion and Fostering Consistency Within Agencies
In order to align presidential priorities with agency policies, presidents
need to clearly articulate their priorities to agencies and also to oversee the
Secretary's implementation of those priorities within the agency.
Frequently, the President by necessity or by choice delegates to agency
heads oversight of exercises of discretion by career staff and line officers.
Still both the implementation of DACA in USCIS and the shifting
strategies for involving local law enforcement in ICE's detention efforts
illustrate that setting macro-level enforcement priorities to systematize
micro-level exercises of enforcement discretion leads to more consistent
results.
Below the level of the President, agency heads can reinforce presidential
priorities through the articulation of operational criteria to guide intra-
agency exercises of discretion. They may set these out in policy statements
or by affirmatively reporting on the considerations behind their decisions in
the course of enforcement. As one of several criteria, agencies should
disclose administrative needs that bear upon their regulatory actions.
These voluntary disclosures would bolster the transparency and, thus, the
procedural legitimacy of agency action. 344 While more complicated in the
enforcement context that is necessarily encased in low-level exercises of
discretion, similar measures to buff policy implementation remain
advisable. 345 Exposing administrative realities might take the sheen off
presidential policies announced from the Rose Garden, but it makes for
smoother implementation and increased effectiveness.
As detailed in the second case study, the President and ICE Director's
344. Increased voluntary disclosure is an idea common to many ACUS
recommendations. See AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATION 2014-3, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS reprinted and codified as
79 Fed. Reg. 35,992 (June 25, 2014); OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, PROPOSED
BULLETIN FOR GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICEs, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/good_guid/good_guidance-preamble.pdf. Some commentators
expressly call for disclosure of political reasons for agency action in rulemaking or in
arbitrary and capricious review. Nina Mendelson, Disclosing Political Oversight of Agency
Decisionmaking, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1128-30 (2010); Kathryn Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE LJ. 2 (2009). The suggestion is similar in
spirit, offered as a best practice rather than a doctrinal reform.
345. See Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1103-
04 (discussing a potential enforcement-coordination role within OIRA). Cox and Rodriguez
applaud the institutionalization of discretion in deferred action and immigration
enforcement specifically.
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macro-level priorities for detention progressively narrowed the scope of
lower-level exercises of discretion.346 While skepticism over the use of
immigration detainers remains, PEP-the program that replaced Secure
Communities-avoids some of the more troubling features that prompted
legal challenge and popular resistance. 347 The change was driven by
operational practices. 348  Successful implementation of the priorities
required agency-specific knowledge of the intricacies of transferring
noncitizens from jail to detention and embeddedness in agency culture. 349
Interviews with policymakers revealed that ICE prided itself on being led
by those who had long been part of the agency, rather than by someone
from outside.350 In one of the few instances where an ICE Director came
from the outside, he confronted initial resistance to change from the career
staff.3 5 ' The failures to align presidential priorities with enforcement
criteria up-and-down the agency hierarchy contributed to inconsistent
results and perceived illegitimacy.
The process of transforming ICE's detainer practices was bumpy. Early
in the Obama Administration, ICE DirectorJohn Morton issued a series of
internal memoranda articulating principles of enforcement discretion to
change its agency culture of nondiscretionary enforcement and to more
effectively implement prior regulations and broad statutory mandates to
focus on "criminal aliens." 352 The Morton memos in 2010 and 2011
should have done more to explain why the agency leadership felt
centralized discretion in enforcement was needed; how it served agency
needs, presidential priorities, and congressional mandates; and what
specific criteria could be applied to its requests that county jails detain
immigrants. Part of this explanation should have been public
administration. For example, the agency could have used a statement of
basis and purpose to describe safety risks to officers effectuating removals in
the field, or identified data disaggregation problems that impeded the
targeting of serious criminals. While explanation may not absolve all
internal dissent, nor should it as a normative matter, the consistent
346. Supra Part II.B.2.
347. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and
Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30J. L. & POL. 411 (2015).
348. Supra Part II.B.2.
349. Supra Part II.B.2.
350. Supra Part II.B.2. Interview with DHS Gen. Counsel Office (June 23, 2016) and
ICE Director (June 13, 2016).
351. Supra Part II.B.2. Interview with DHS Gen. Counsel Office (May 31, 2016; July 5,
2016) and ICE Director (June 13, 2016).
352. Morton memo, supra note 143.
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application of operational procedures incentivizes intra-agency
accountability through ICE's chain of command.353  This, in turn,
permitted disagreements to be worked out with a supervisor rather than in
individual cases in a manner that can undermine agency performance. 354
An improved approach toward intra-agency and federal-state
interactions on detainers parallels some of the increased procedure
recommended for deferred action. Within the agency, instilling ICE with
macro-level priorities and a more professional culture reigned in abuses of
discretion at the micro-level. 355 As between ICE and local jails, nonbinding
federal detainer policies reliant on voluntary cooperation takes a softer
touch. While the federal government can try to entice cooperation within
this framework of discretionary decisions, it cannot force states and
localities to cooperate. States are free to choose, and they are unlikely to
choose cooperation without being persuaded of the legitimacy of the federal
programs.
3. Prescriptions to Promote Interagency Coordination
Presidents should encourage more interagency consultation and
coordination across the executive branch. The OIRA regulatory planning
process might assist these bilateral discussions by excavating agency plans
for policymaking and adjudication. Agency heads also need to be given a
motivation for engaging one another across agencies; otherwise, their
default is to operate in silos. Agencies also need to be given mechanisms
and incentives to engage one another. The top-down chain of command
within a single agency does not pertain to bilateral discussions across
agencies that require different tools of policymaking. Interagency working
groups and the formulation of Memorandums of Understanding might help
353. The function of internal dissent as a check on executive authority is briefly taken
up in the next section that considers the objections to the desirability of centralized and
coordinated decision-making (infra Part III.B). Distinguishing between dissent premised on
disagreements within a permissible realm of discretion and infidelity to organizational
objectives and leadership is difficult and important, and it should be examined in future
research.
354. Interview with DHS Gen. Counsel Office (June 23, 2016) and ICE Director (June
13, 2016).
355. As briefly reported in the DACA case study, the President and DHS Secretary set
macro-level priorities for USCIS that agency officials could implement when processing
individual applications for DACA. Beyond promoting a coherent vision, policy leaders
worked to instill a more professional culture of agency decisionmaking that aligned the
granting of deferred action with the policy of protecting DREAMers from deportation.
Supra Part II.B.1.
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to serve this purpose in other rulemaking contexts.35 6  Rulemaking
mechanisms exist to incorporate multiple actors in policy regarding matters
of shared concern, especially in the early stages of policymaking. However,
a coordinating body needs to provide incentives for agencies to work
together outside of their usual mechanisms and strong relationships
between the agencies need to exist for successful cooperation. When ex ante
coordination of agencies is not possible, the President and the agencies
should minimize institutional leapfrogging and instead move incrementally
and cyclically to give each other opportunities for catch up, realignment,
and buy-in.
This suggestion for interagency coordination extends to both agency
rulemaking and agency adjudication. Immigration adjudication, especially
for asylum seekers, illustrates how interagency consultation can fall apart
when the investigative and adjudicative functions are divided across two
agencies.35 7 The immigration courts receive attention from the President
when their priorities intersect with presidential priorities. 358 The hasty
institution of priority docketing to reduce long delays attempted to
ameliorate doubts about the fairness of asylum adjudication processing and
family detention and to serve the President's intended goal of deterring a
surge in unauthorized migration from Central America. 359 However, by all
accounts, the effort was haphazard and clumsily implemented.
In stark contrast to the principles of administrative regularity prescribed
in this Article, DHS's shifting practices of family detention, EOIR's rapid
agency adjudication, and ICE's targeted raids subsequent to removal orders
caught many of the immigration attorneys and agency officials involved in
the complex process of adjudication by surprise. 360 Even though a DHS
enforcement priorities memo presaged the operation, the orders appeared
to "come from the top" given the lack of public engagement during the
formation of the enforcement priority and the shifting strategies of
implementation. 361 DHS conveyed piecemeal rationales to the public in
356. Interagency workings groups, joint rulemaking, and other multi-member
coordinative devices are discussed in Freeman & Rossi, supra note 91, at 1175; Renan, supra
note 113, at 214.
357. Supra Part II.B.3; Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 115(a)-(b) (2012)
(separating the investigation function across multiple federal agencies).
358. Supra Part II.B.3. Interview with DOJ EOIR immigration attorney (Nov. 9, 2016).
359. Id.
360. Supra Part II.B.3; Dan Hernandez, Fear Overrides Everything: Immigrants Desperate for
Reassurance after ICE Raids, GUARDIAN (Jan.6, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jan/06/ice-raids-immigrant-families-deportation-fear.
361. Interviews with immigration attorneys and community organizers (May 30, 2016;
June 6, 2016;June 10, 2016).
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the aftermath of its raids through Secretary Johnson's press statements. 362
But after-the-fact justifications do little to guide implementation. The
agencies were unprepared for the volume of new cases and strained to fulfill
their new goals. 363 Lawsuits continue to challenge the due process of the
procedures that resulted from DHS and DOJ's flawed interagency
adjudication. 364
Coordination is a critical task for an administrator-in-chief in a complex
bureaucracy. DHS might point to the crisis nature of its response and
expediency as reasons to grant greater leniency to Operation Border
Guardian than the other executive actions. However, going forward, the
DOJ should make more accessible the interagency coordinating memos
between EOIR and DHS that reshape immigration court proceedings. in
order to improve the orderly adjudication of high stakes cases.
While these simple changes would not be enough to foster full consensus
over the moral and legal dimensions of apprehending asylum-seekers
through the use of family detention and priority docketing, more coherence
in the program's stated goal of deterrence, better intra- and interagency
coordination, and more consistent outcomes across agency adjudications
could avoid some of the institutional harms. Fundamentally, the goal of
this Article is not to elevate procedural criteria of legitimacy over
substantive criteria of legitimacy or to say that one substitutes for the other.
It is to highlight an underappreciated dimension of administrative
behaviors that legitimate executive action and to suggest that, as a
prudential matter, paying attention to procedure can either improve the
best conceived substantive policies or ameliorate the worst of them.
B. Countering Objections
The suggestions for the President and agencies emphasize voluntary
measures to improve the perceived legitimacy of regulatory actions
undertaken for reasons of good governance and effective administration.
The suggestion for the President is to use regulatory planning more broadly
and more stringently when engaging with agencies (to promote coherence),
and to rely more heavily on Regulatory Policy Officers to integrate policy
imperatives with operational considerations (to promote consistency).
Agencies should voluntarily and affirmatively disclose the motivations and
362. See text accompanying supra note 284 for DHS Secretary Johnson's description of
the raids.
363. Interviews with immigration attorneys and community organizers (May 20, 2016;
June 6, 2016;June 10, 2016).
364. See, e.g., R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015); Castro v. DHS,
163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
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justifications for their policies, enhancing their ability to align policies with
presidential priorities and to reconcile competing political, legal, and
professional pressures (coherence and consistency). Finally, the President's
offices should develop mechanisms to facilitate interagency coordination in
more systematized ways (coordination). While not a comprehensive
formula for administrative success, the recommendations illustrate how the
theory of President as Administrator-in-Chief could enhance presidential
policymaking through agencies.
Whatever their virtues, there are objections. This section addresses
concerns that the proposed reforms are unnecessary, unworkable, or
undesirable.
The most obvious concern about a call for more procedure is that
demanding more procedure will result in unnecessary delay. For example,
USCIS officials involved in the implementation of DACA and the defense
of DAPA might claim the additional procedures would not improve the
quality of the policy and would run afoul of the virtues of presidential and
agency enforcement discretion.365 ICE officials might argue that opening
up the procedures to public scrutiny risks the release of dangerous criminal
aliens while waiting for the voluntary compliance of jails in sanctuary city
jurisdictions. 366 Border Patrol might argue that cumbersome delay in
asylum adjudication processes invite continued and high-levels of
unauthorized migration. 367
In defense of their concerns for too much procedure, the law
traditionally shields the President from requirements to justify his actions,
particularly in areas entrusted to enforcement discretion or in matters of
365. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Counci4 Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978), and SEC v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S.194, 202-03 (1947), together protect the
discretion of the agency to choose its forms of rulemaking and resist the imposition of more
procedure by courts.
366. Under the Trump Administration, the DHS and DOJ have both taken this
position. Leah Barkoukis, DHS Issues First Report Calling Out Sanctuary Cities That Refused to
Cooperate with Federal Authorities, TOWNHALL (Mar. 20, 2017), https://townhall.com/
tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2017/03/20/dhs-declined-detainer-outcome-report-n2301714; Sari
Horwitz & Maria Sacchetti, Attorney GeneralJeffSessions Repeats Trump Threat that Sanctuary Cities
Could Lose Justice Department Grants, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-repeats-trump-threat-that-
sanctuary-cities-could-lose-justice-department-grants/2017/03/27/1 fa38e2a- 1315-11 e7-
9e4f-09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utmterm=.cc275ff9 1747.
367. Under the Trump Administration, the DOJ EOIR has taken this position. Tess
Owen, Immigration Double Down: New DOJ Immigration Memo Targets Asylum Seekers and Vulnerable
Kids, Attorneys Say, VICE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/new-doj-immigration-
memo-targets-most-vulnerable-kids-and-asylum-seekers-attorneys-say.
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sovereignty. 368 The APA protects agencies from disclosing scrutiny for
internal operations, internal deliberations, non-final actions, and exercises
of discretion that involve complicated balancing of multiple factors,
revelation of sensitive matters, or frank and open internal discussion. 369
Demanding more procedure could perversely incentivize agencies to avoid
rulemaking altogether or suffer a loss of the relative flexibility and efficiency
of guidance over notice-and-comment rulemaking, resulting in failures to
act on pressing regulatory matters.3 70 If so, concerns of ossification in the
rulemaking context could be transferred into the guidance context.37 1
My response to the concern for unnecessary delay is that even where
bolstering procedure may not make for swift action, the value of these
measures resides in promoting the three C's of public administration-
coherence, consistency, and coordination-that in turn enhance the
procedural legitimacy of executive agency action. The difference between
the relative success of DACA and the failure of DAPA demonstrates the
value of added procedure in the face of contest. Moreover, the USCIS's
rush to implement deferred action churned up legal challenge and public
protest that generated delay and impaired implementation of the programs.
The same is true for the use of immigration detainers, which had to be
reconstituted from Secure Communities to the more scaled-back and
deliberately-implement PEP, and continues to falter under challenges to its
legitimacy. The organizational chaos and failure to swiftly and accurately
368. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). The Plenary Power doctrine is
another instantiation of this principle, though its normative force is eroding over time in
immigration. See Chin, Is There a Plenay Power Doctrine?, supra note 24; Kevin R.Johnson, Race
and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenay Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. LJ. 257 (1999); Legomsky, supra note 31.
369. See generally APA of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
370. Conor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 107-
08 (2015), Keith Barnett & Chris Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017); Jennifer Nou, Ageng Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755 (2013) (self-insulation as agency response to presidential review, not APA
guidance); Michael Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Ageng Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
609 (2014) (similar for avoiding cost-benefit); see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208
F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (incentive to promulgate mush and risk of agency abuse). As one
example of many scholars describing the burdensome effect of increasing procedures
required of agencies, see Shapiro et. al., supra note 34, at 464 (2012) (reporting that
rulemaking takes too long and is largely in vain).
371. Id. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing
the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012); cf Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulator Volume
and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012); Raso, supra note 370.
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manage the migration of Central American asylum-seekers suggests that
the forceful implementation of hastily-drafted policies is not succeeding.
A second objection to confining the President's focus to procedure is that
separating internal procedure from substantive policy is unworkable. One
reason is that the conflation of substance and procedure by the President or
his agencies may be strategic. For example, community activists are quick
to point out that President Obama scored political points by issuing
DACA.3 72 The blurring of substance and procedure may be the product of
the inevitable difficulty of disentangling substance and procedure, even in
the absence of intentional obfuscation. For example, the ramped up
enforcement against asylum seekers is premised on the theory that
institutional delay invites flouting of immigration law, not malevolence
toward asylum seekers.
My response is that, in a number of contexts, case law and policy
manages the distinction. Civil procedure cases separate agency procedures
conflating means with ends. 373 Administrative law makes exceptions to
rulemaking exemptions for procedures that "encode substantive value
judgments" or affect "primary conduct." 374 Other legal tests recognize that
even where the intention of a policy is procedural, substantive effects may
be too great to warrant insulation from external review. 375  These
objections are raised in the administrative law scholars' amicus brief, siding
with the U.S. government's defense of DAPA in the Texas v. United States
litigation. Setting aside doctrine, practice also suggests that procedure can
tame substance. ICE showed less of a change of heart over the substantive
goals of removing criminal aliens and more of an increased willingness to
pursue enforcement priorities that targeted their efforts toward serious
criminals, kept them safe from dangerous field operations, and appealed to
their sense of law enforcement expertise and professional judgment.376
372. Interviews with immigration attorneys and community organizers (May 20, 2016;
June 6, 2016;June 10, 2016).
373. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (concerning the
substance/procedure divide).
374. See Air Transport Ass'n of Am. v. DOT, 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also id.
(Silberman,J. dissenting).
375. See guidance tests for substantial impact, see e.g., Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813
F.2d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting substantial-impact test during review of an earlier
Immigration and Naturalization Service policy statement on deferred action); supra note 95.
376. A different concern about workability is whether a President or agency would be
willing to disclose information that they are not legally required to share under existing
statutes and case law. Executive privilege alleviates the President of the obligation to
disclose information about the inner workings of government. United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing a qualified presidential privilege as byproduct of the president's
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A final objection to concentrating presidential power on effective
administration is that too much coherence, coordination, and centralizing
of discretion is normatively undesirable. For example, promoting coherent
presidential policy can disguise substantive disagreement or squelch the
push and pull of compromise that can lead to the generation of policy
alternatives.377  This type of internal debate might have improved ICE's
practices of immigration detention, which suffered a blind spot toward the
brewing litigation over the balance of state and federal power and respect
for criminal procedure. It might have softened the response to Central
American asylum seekers, especially the children who went unrepresented
in immigration court or were held in hastily-constructed family detention
centers.
In more abstracted form, the objections raise fundamental disputes
about executive power. Insisting on coherence in the executive branch
sounds similar to making arguments supporting a unitary executive, or at
least a strong president, in the face of national emergency.3 78 Too much
supremacy in executive affairs and as a function of separation of powers). FOIA exemptions
similarly permit agencies to hold back inter- and intra-agency memos. Exemption 5 of the
Freedom of Information Act protects "interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). APA doctrines insulate such agency matters from the
typical presumption of reviewability in court. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (showing that
requirements for notice-and-comment do not apply to "rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice). My response is to clarify that the suggestion is for voluntary and
affirmative disclosure. Undertaking the suggestions would be a prudential practice; it would
not be legally compelled. Looking at recent experience, presidents and their agencies do
reveal more than is legally required for the purpose of promoting open government. See
Barack H. Obama, Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685-86 (Jan. 26, 2009);
Peter R. Orszag, OMB, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies on the Open Government Directive (Dec. 8, 2009);
Eric H. Holder, OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on the Freedom of Information Act (Mar. 19, 2009).
377. Public choice theory posits that political actors are self-interested and will enact
deliberately ambiguous policies to secure passage of legislation or obscure electoral
retribution. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK supra note 38.
378. Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein explain the basic premise of the unitary
executive and claim that "No one denies that in some sense the framers created a unitary
executive; the question is in what sense." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 8. In either its
strong or weak form, the theory limits the power of Congress to divest the President of
control of the executive branch. Id. at 8-9. For an example of the theory, see Steven
Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitay Executive, Plural judiciay, 105
HARv. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992). For a critique, see David Barron & Marty
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centralization of discretion can detract from the expert judgment presumed
in the granting of deference to agency discretion or upset the balance of
career civil servants and political leadership engaged in policy
implementation. Too much consistency can impede individualized
determinations required for the dispensation of real rather than routinized
justice.3 79 Too much insistence on coordination across agencies, like too
much coordination within agencies, can eliminate diversity of opinion and
can impede the experimentation and sharing of experience that improves
the quality of agency decisionmaking.380
My response to this important objection, which enduring and prolonged
scholarly debate has not resolved, is that the trade-off between the virtues
and vices of a good and well-administered government are somewhat
unavoidable. This Article sides with the aspiration of a well-administered
program for the purpose of legitimating agency actions, which are
inherently vulnerable to challenge. This approach is particularly favored in
the presence of complex and contested policies where the definition of the
substantive good cannot be agreed upon. The case studies demonstrate the
value of carefully-constructed and well-administered policies that can
balance the trade-offs between flexibility and procedure. As illustrative
examples, the setting of coherent priorities for immigration enforcement
that can be translated into operational strategies that are implemented on
the basis of experience and expertise-the strategy that underlies all three
programs examined in the Article-strives for such a balance. Tipping the
balance toward efficacy might be rejected by those who disagree with its
substantive ends. And there will always be substantive disagreement in the
face of a morally complex, value-laden subject such as immigration.
However, nobody wins if the alternative course is not a transformation of
those ends toward consensus goals but instead a poorly-implemented policy
that compromises the institutional processes meant to stabilize the federal
government amid change and controversy.
CONCLUSION
This Article claims that the legitimacy of presidential influence over
agency policy turns on the soundness of motivations for intervention and
the quality of the procedures used by the President and agency to govern.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Orginal
Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REV. 689 (2008) (arguing that Constitution does not provide for
a strong unitary executive outside the military context).
379. See generally MAsHAw, BUREAUCRATICJUSTICE, supra note 27.
380. See Renan, supra note 113, at 275 (discussing the pernicious aspects and trade-offs
against the salutary aspects, yet mostly hopeful on coordination.).
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This is especially true for morally controversial policies. In making this
claim, this Article states that presidential actions should be analytically
disaggregated into their procedural and substantive policymaking
dimensions rather than judging the policies by substance alone. The
administrative dimension of presidential action is frequently overlooked in
the scholarship on presidential control and the legitimacy of the
administrative state. 38 1  This perspective on good governance as a
legitimating force contributes to established understandings of
administrative legitimacy as a normative goal, and it does so in an
empirically grounded way.
The case studies in this Article primarily concern the President's role in
immigration enforcement policy. While the full spectrum of immigration
policy, let alone all regulatory policy, is beyond the scope of this Article, the
institutional features of DHS represented in the three specific immigration
policies cover an array of policymaking devices used in immigration:
policies involving internal administration with and without policymaking
consequences; policies using legislative, enforcement, and adjudicative
form; and policies generating legal and political challenge from inside and
outside the executive branch. Similar analysis could be undertaken with
regard to other executive enforcement actions, with the transferability of
the lessons facilitated by similarities in the institutional arrangement
between the agency and the President and the politics surrounding the
substantive policies.382  Longitudinal studies comparing administrative
actions within a single policy area across presidential administrations, as
opposed to the cross-sectional study comparing multiple policies within a
single administration, would also be instructive.38 3 Comparisons across
381. See supra Part I.A.
382. An important limitation is that the study does not cover independent agencies.
Further study of the internal dynamics in independent agencies would be beneficial, given
their multimember leadership and the greater concerns for legitimacy vis-4-vis the President
and Congress. A promising study of independent agencies concerns expressions of dissent
within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the FCC. See SharonJacobs, Administrative Dissent (manuscript on file with author).
Although the research design in this Article analyzes procedures rather than substantive
policies and politics across case studies, the case analysis sheds some light on the later
comparison: for example, noting differences in the politics surrounding DACA and DAPA
or the distinctiveness of controlling the migration of recently-arrived asylum-seekers as
opposed to long-time undocumented immigrants.
383. See, e.g., Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 91 (2015) (discussing the Clinton and Bush Administrations' education policy);
Zachary Price, Politics ofNonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119 (2015) (immigration
and other controversies under Reagan, Bush, and Obama).
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policy arenas would be difficult to undertake in systematic fashion given the
institutional, political, and policy contingencies, but they would
undoubtedly be valuable to the institutional analysis as well.384
Limitations notwithstanding, the lessons generated by studying the role
of the Presidency and the administrative process of immigration
enforcement are important to immigration law and policy.
Immigration policymakers and scholars recognize that there is a slim
chance for moral consensus around national policy in immigration. 385 In
the absence of such possibilities, the imaginative capacity of policy
reformers should stretch beyond substantive policies to include the
procedural means of addressing them. The shift will require meaningful
engagement between the President, DHS leadership, and civil servants who
implement the policies of the President. The lesson from administrative
law is that executive policy is always vulnerable to challenge, let alone when
there is the level of controversy surrounding immigration. The fervor
surrounding immigration law only makes it more important to consider
prudential measures in agency policymaking. The political leadership
needs to receive input from experts who are well-versed in the intricacies of
implementing immigration law and relatively more insulated from its
politics. They need to move deliberatively to improve the operation of the
immigration bureaucracy that is a vital site of immigration policymaking.
Moreover, rising political division and abrupt realignments of the
presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court heighten the ever-present
need for constraints on executive authority. Immigration policy is privy to
policy excess, given the emotions that it stirs and its intertwining with
convictions about what structural, demographic, and cultural change
means for America. It is prone to executive abuse given the long tradition
of deference to the political branches and the possibilities of evading
scrutiny through multiple assertions of exceptionalism: as a policy
concerning sovereignty, public safety, and otherwise irregular
circumstances. Moreover, the administrative aspects of immigration
policies-their origins, justifications, and consequences-are highly
technical and can seem opaque to policy insiders and outsiders. Rather
than reflexively fearing the role of the federal government in immigration3 86
384. Several ACUS commissioned studies have this potential, including forthcoming
interagency studies on guidance by Nicholas Parillo and an interagency study on agency
adjudication by Michael Asimov (on file with authors).
385. Tal Kopan, Immigration Policy in 2017? Good With That Say Veterans, CNN (Feb. 14,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/13/politics/immigration-policy-reform-congress-
chances/.
386. Concerns with the Plenary Power Doctrine occupy a prominent part of
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or shying away from the mess of immigration politics, contemporary
politics and policymaking require that immigration policy move into the
realm of administrative normalcy. The perennial issues in public policy and
public administration should inform them how to advance coherent,
consistent, and well-coordinated policy responses in a manner that is well-
informed, effective, and fair.38 7
Misunderstanding the relationship between presidential administration
and presidential policy in immigration is costly. The failure to distinguish
the President's administrative and policymaking objectives leads to political
encroachment on agency expertise and independence. And the false
assumption that agencies engaged in the tasks of public administration are
using internal means to circumvent external oversight breeds suspicion of
agencies' motives with regard to policymaking and undermines the capacity
for democratic legitimacy. This mutual suspicion leads to poor governance,
divisive politics, and ultimately bad policy. More generally, the conflation
of internal and external administration of law in immigration policy
exacerbates chronic concerns about the legitimacy of both presidential
power and administrative action.388 Presidents and agencies need to work
together to establish themselves as legitimate administrators and effective
policymaking partners in the modern regulatory state.
immigration scholarship. See, e.g., Chin, Is There a Plenay Power Doctrine?, supra note 24; see
Johnson, supra note 368; Legomsky, supra note 31.
387. See Online Symposium: Is Immigration Law Administrative Law?, Introduction by Jill E.
Family, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG, (Feb 8, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/online-symposium-is-immigration-law-administrative-law-
introduction-by-jill-e-family/.
388. JAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 9-10 (1978) (characterizing concerns
about executive action as "strong and persistent," engendering a sense of crisis that surpasses
routine criticism). A more contemporary articulation of this concern can be seen in several
manifestations of Congress's agenda for preventing executive overreach. See, e.g., H.R. 76
Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017; H.R. 26 Regulations from the Executive in
Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017.
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